This article was written as part of a project supported by
IKV-Interchurch Peace Council, Netherlands.
In the Palestinian context, "normalization" (tatbi'a in Arabic) has
been defined as "the process of building open and reciprocal
relations with Israel in all fields, including the political
economic, social, cultural, educational, legal, and security
fields." (1) Not all Palestinians have the same stance toward
normalization, however, and differ even in their willingness to use
the word. Some say the word tatbi'a must not be used because it
refers to conducting normal relations with Israel, which is
currently impossible.
The process of normalization is considered to be positive from the
point of view of the "normalizers," because, in their view, it
represents the beginning of a process to transform the relationship
with Israel from an abnormal one to a normal one that will allow
Israel to be integrated into the Arab region instead of continuing
to look westward and seeking to be part of Europe. Its opponents
argue that normalization is a process that Arabs can have with
countries that have not attacked and occupied Arab lands. Israel,
however, was built at the expense of the Palestinian people, most
of whom were evacuated from their homeland in 1948 by Jewish
military groups. Therefore, the opponents ask how can it be
possible to normalize relations with Israel when it has built its
existence at the expense of others, who live either as refugees
scattered around the world, or under Israeli occupation in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, and as unequal citizens within
Israel?
For the purpose of this paper, anti-normalization positions will be
defined as those that do not accept the Other, either as an
individual, a group, or a nation. The search for anti-normalization
positions have been conducted in both societies, and conclusions
regarding what can be done include suggestions for the two peoples
across the divide.
This paper shows how the anti-normalization discourse sometimes
overlaps with, and sometimes contradicts the peace-building
process, especially since an anti-normalization stance does not
always mean a rejection of all relations. On the contrary, an
anti-normalization position might reject normalcy now, but accept
it after the achievement of peace, or it might reject normalcy but
accept negotiations (on the official level), or dialogue (on the
popular level). The main aim of this paper is to unravel some of
this complexity, and to develop some recommendations for the peace
movements regarding how to deal with the anti-normalization
discourse.
Arab Anti-Normalization Positions
The anti-normalization positions in the Arab world fall into four
main categories: Islam, Arab Marxism, Arab nationalism, and a mix
of different ideological groups who all agree on the importance of
resisting so-called "cultural normalization."
a. The root of the Islamic anti-normalization position comes from
the belief that Palestine is an Islamic waqf (endowment), and that
Jews have no rights at all in it. Consequently, Israel's existence
is not legitimate, and therefore it is not possible to recognize
it.(2) The stance of Palestinian Islamists is more moderate than
this. Since the beginning of 1994, the position of Hamas has been
to accept coexistence with Israel without recognition, and without
normalizing relations.(3)
b. The Marxist position on normalization is inherited from their
anti-imperialist stance; therefore, they speak against normalizing
with Israel as a part of their anti-normalization towards
imperialism. This Marxist anti-normalization propaganda was strong
in the Arab world during the 1970s and 1980s, and they put it into
practice through anti-normalization committees such as the
Committee for the Defense of the Arab National Culture in Egypt.
With the collapse of most of the Arab Marxist groups, the Marxist
anti-normalization trend has continued among groups of
intellectuals who refuse normalization within the broader framework
of the rejection of both social and cultural consumerism.
c. The third anti-normalization position is that of the Arab
nationalists, whose position towards Israel has passed through two
stages. In the first stage, which lasted until the 1970s, the Arab
nationalists considered Israel (which they called "the Zionist
entity") to be a threat to Arab national unity, because
geographically it has separated the Arab east from the Arab west,
and has also taken part of Arab land. In the 1970s the Arab
nationalists split into two different groups with respect to their
stance regarding normalization. The official Arab position was
expressed in a readiness to participate in negotiations with Israel
through an international peace conference in Geneva as early as
1973. A second position, held by Arab nationalist intellectuals,
rejected negotiations with Israel - even if they did not lead to
the recognition of and the establishment of a normal relationship
with Israel. It should be noted here that even those Arab
nationalists who have taken part in official negotiations with
Israel, such as the Syrian regime, make a distinction between
negotiating with Israel and normalizing with Israel.
d. The last category consists of a mixture of groups all of which
call for the rejection of cultural normalization. Those working
against cultural normalization include various religious, national,
and Marxist orientations, some of whom believe that fighting
against political and economic normalization is not likely to
succeed. Therefore, they consider it is better to concentrate on
preserving the last and most important "garrison": Arabic
culture.
Palestinian Anti-Normalization Positions
Relatively different from the Islamists in the Arab world, the
Palestinian Hamas is willing to accept the existence of Israel
following a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, the Gaza
Strip, and Arab East Jerusalem. The Islamic Jihad has also held
this position since the beginning of 2004. Furthermore, Hamas does
not completely oppose any dialogue with the Israelis. In fact, some
Hamas members (who later split from the group), along with people
who are close to Hamas (from the Muslim Brotherhood), have
participated in religious dialogues with Israelis. These include
Sheikh Jamil Hamami from the West Bank and Sheikh Imad Falouji from
the Gaza Strip.
Palestinian radical Marxists, mainly the Palestinian Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), are only willing to consider
normalization with the Jewish anti-Zionist groups inside Israel.
During the 1970s, the PFLP built relations with the Israeli
Trotskyist organization Matzpen, and later on developed minimal
ties with the Israeli Communist Party. Other Palestinian Marxists
(The Palestinian Communist Party, The Palestinian Democratic Union
[FIDA], and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
[DFLP]) were more flexible than the PFLP, and accepted
normalization not only with the Israeli Communist Party, but also
with Israeli peace groups who believed in a two-state solution and
who supported the Palestinian people's right to
self-determination.
The Arab nationalists in Palestine, who represent a minority of
Ba'athists, the PFLP General Command, and individual Arab
nationalists, have rejected all kinds of normalization with Israel
including its political, social, economic, and cultural forms. In
1994 this group formulated the so-called "Committee Against
Normalization" in cooperation with some members of the PFLP. This
committee tried to confront all aspects of normalization; however,
its contradictory agendas led to its collapse less than six months
after its formation.(4)
The four Arab trends have had an impact on Palestine; however,
there is an important fifth position, that of the Palestinian
nationalists, that plays a unique role. Although the Palestinian
nationalists - led by the main PLO faction of Fateh - are not
necessarily against Arab nationalism, they maintain that the
liberation of Palestine is primarily a Palestinian responsibility,
and that Arab countries should support the Palestinians in their
struggle by providing geographical and humanitarian depth. Fateh
worked to promote Palestinian interests, which sometimes coincided
- and sometimes conflicted - with the interests of the Arab
countries. Working for the Palestinian interest led Fateh to work
with Israeli groups whenever it felt this would further their
goals. Therefore, as a pragmatic movement, Fateh embarked on a
normalization process with Israel (both on the official and popular
levels), mainly through its upper- and middle-rank leaders in the
early 1970s, via meetings with the Israeli Communist Party. It
progressed in the 1980s through "contacts" and meetings with the
Israeli peace movement, and then peaked with the negotiations and
the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles.(5) Also Fateh
members have participated in joint projects with Israeli
organizations close to Labor and even Likud until the beginning of
the 2000 intifada when Fateh followers began to feel that if
Palestinians continued to meet with the Israeli movements, this
might be viewed as though the situation was satisfactory and peace
agreements need not be rushed. It is worth noting that even this
new position does not call for severing relations with the Israeli
solidarity groups that honestly and sincerely join the Palestinians
in what together they view as a shared struggle for justice and
human rights.*
The Contradictions in the Anti-normalization Positions
Several other questions and contradictions have been raised
regarding the Palestinian and Arab positions vis-à-vis
normalization:
* Is it correct to say that a peaceful settlement will succeed on
all Arab fronts, and in all stages, and the task is to confront it?
Or is the task to show its failures, and also to prevent its
implementation on all fronts?
* Is it possible to work against all aspects of normalization? Or
should the focus be against cultural normalization since the
struggle against political and economic normalization cannot
succeed?
* Is it possible to separate between negotiations, a peace
settlement, and normalization? Or do the meanings of these terms
overlap?
* Is it possible to include the supporters of the Madrid process,
and the Syrian-Israeli negotiations in the anti-normalization
groups?
* Is it possible to work with Israeli anti-Zionists - along with
Israeli peace groups -against normalization with Israel on the
official level? (6)
The Israeli Positions on Normalization
When discussing normalization, Israel is often represented as the
side looking for peace and open relations with all the Arab
countries, while anti-normalization is portrayed as a purely Arab
position. This is simply untrue, as there is also deep opposition
to normalization on the Israeli side. Outside of the current
Israeli official positions, which are primary reasons for the
failure in achieving peace with the Palestinians as well as with
the Syrians, there are several Israeli anti-normalization positions
that should be analyzed in greater depth.
The first position is related to the question of whether Israel
considers itself part of the Middle East or part of the Western
world. If Israel continues to see itself as part of the Western
world, it will fail to build normal relations with the Arabs of the
Middle East. Ironically, this stance mirrors the position of Arabs
who refuse to integrate Israel into the region.
A second contradiction in Israel's position regarding normalization
is that its government seeks normalization with the Arabs more as a
means for joining the United States in its domination of the area
than as a tool for integrating into the region. It is clear that
this form of "normalization" will not lead to Arab equality with
Israel; rather, it would simply deepen the strategic relations
between Israel and the U.S., and lead to the fruition of plans,
like those of Shimon Peres, that combine cheap Arab labor with
Israeli technology in order "to develop the Middle East into a
paradise." (7) However, Arab states have not only failed to
integrate Israel into the area, they have also failed to develop a
formula for partnership (including economic partnership) with
Israel, as an alternative to Israeli-U.S. dominance.
A third contradiction noted by some Arab anti-normalization groups
is that Israel wants the Arab countries to establish relations with
it that are stronger than among Arab states themselves. Several
writers have commented that the normal relations Arabs have with
most countries do not lead those countries to, for example, ask for
changes in Arab education curricula or to interference in media
policy. Therefore, these authors have concluded that Israel is
looking for extra-normal relations with the Arab countries. (8)
Another case in point is the Israeli demands to be invited to Arab
summit meetings.* Of course it is the responsibility of Arabs to
stop incitement against the Jews in schools and media, just as it
is Israel's responsibility to reciprocate and end incitement
against the Arabs in its media and school curricula.
The fourth contradiction consists of Israel asking the Arabs to do
things that Israel itself will not commit to. The primary example
here is the issue of disarmament, including nuclear weapons. For
instance, Israel wants a Palestinian state free of heavy weaponry
while the State of Israel would maintain the right to possess all
kinds of weapons. Israel calls for an Arab world free of weapons of
mass destruction, although Israel itself is not prepared to get rid
of such weapons. These kinds of contradictions only serve to make
it very difficult for the Arabs to deal normally with Israel.
In addition to these general contradictions, other specific ones
arise from the positions of the Israeli settlers and right-wing
political groups. The settlers consider the Palestinians to be
foreigners living in the Land of Israel. As one of settler leader
told his Dutch visitors in July 2003: "They [the Palestinians] are
foreigners, residents in Israel but not citizens, therefore they do
not have the rights of citizens and they must choose either to live
as Israel wants and under Israeli rules, or to leave the country."
(9) Israeli right-wing parties range from those that call for the
transfer of the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank, the Gaza
Strip and inside Israel to Arab countries (Moledet Party), to those
who recognize the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as
residents but not as citizens of this land (Likud and other
right-wing organizations).
Recognition of the Palestinian people remains a big problem even
for those working for Israeli-Palestinian normalization. The
post-Oslo Israeli governments, for example, still consider the
Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza as "residents in
disputed areas" (previously they were considered Jordanian citizens
in the West Bank, and persons with undetermined citizenship in
Gaza). For East Jerusalemites, the situation is even worse:
Palestinians are still considered by Israel to be "Jordanian
citizens residing in Israeli land." If one does not recognize the
citizenship of the other, how can one normalize relations with that
other? When one introduces the issue of the Palestinian refugees,
the issue gets even worse, as Israel continues to officially deny
its responsibility in the matter, let alone recognize their right
to return.
Conclusion: What Can Be Done?
Although the Israeli-Palestinian situation is not normal - and
might not become normal because of the occupation and expansion of
Israeli settlements- the analysis presented above would suggest
that in the Palestinian-Israeli context, Palestinian readiness to
normalize with Israel is higher than Israeli readiness to normalize
with the Palestinians.
Among the Palestinians, people are divided on the issue of
normalization, between those currently normalizing with Israel, and
those who want to postpone normalization until after the
establishment of the Palestinian state. There is, relatively
speaking, no problem for Palestinians to accept the Other who
shares the same land. Even the minority of Palestinians who do not
want normalization with Israel even after the establishment of a
Palestinian state, accept the principle of peaceful coexistence
with Israel once a long-term non-belligerent situation is
achieved.
The situation is the reverse on the Israeli side. This ranges from
the government that claims there is no Palestinian partner for
peace, to the right-wing politicians who do not consider the
Palestinians to be people, to all the policies on the right or the
left according to which Israelis consider and deal with the
Palestinians as unequal partners, or pretend to cooperate with them
while at the same time seek to dominate them.
Among the Israelis, there are four positions towards normalization,
all of which are problematic in terms of building healthy and
normal relations with the Palestinians. The first is the position
of anti-normalization with the Palestinians represented not only by
the government but also by right-wing political groups and a
majority of Israelis looking to get rid of the Palestinians. The
second, in contrast, looks for extra-normalization with the Arabs
and the Palestinians. This position is related to the third:
normalization with the Arabs and the Palestinians from a hegemonic
and patronizing position, where the Israeli side will have more
power and hence greater dominance. These two positions are
complimentary, because it seems that extra-normalization is needed
in order to achieve hegemony and dominance. These two positions
represent the views of the Israeli Labor Party, and even other
Israeli peace movements who manage their relations and negotiations
with Palestinians in such a way as to promote their own goals. The
fourth Israeli position involves normalizing the abnormal. This is
evident in the focus of the Israeli peace camp on their relations
with the Palestinians while simultaneously failing to change
Israeli public opinion, which creates an illusion of normalization
between the two peoples that, in fact, does not exist.
Taking into consideration this asymmetric situation, the question
becomes how to convince some Palestinian academics and civil
society organizations to deal with the Israeli Zionist peace camp
now, even when they cannot see any signs that this will lead to the
recognition of the Palestinian people's rights to
self-determination. This is especially challenging since many of
these individuals and groups already have their own relations with
Israeli anti-Zionist and post-Zionist academics and civil society
organizations. These groups can and must continue normalizing with
the groups they choose. For the sake of pluralism and diversity, it
is important that each side respect the other's approach to
normalization, as well as the differences between the two sides.
This is the essence of pluralism and respect for diversity.
What is needed now is a formula that enables all the
normalization/anti-normalization processes to peacefully coexist,
without the use of violence against each other and without accusing
the others of treason, collaboration, or extremism. At the same
time, both societies across the divide need to develop a formula
for all these groups to come together to work on shared themes,
such as combating the separation wall on Palestinian land and, most
importantly, struggling against occupation as the main evil which
gives rise to other evils such as terrorism.
In order to build joint actions, there must be respect for one
another's positions. As a result, individuals should not express
personal outrages against the positions with which they disagree,
but rather make an effort to understand the deeper roots of these
positions and to respect them. It is important to exchange views
and to learn the positions of others, who may provide new and
different ways of thinking about normalization. Moreover, since the
majority of Palestinians accept normalization with Israel if the
occupation ends, it should be emphasized that if the Israeli peace
camp strengthens its work against the occupation within Israeli
society, it will build trust among Palestinians, which could lead
to a willingness to normalize. Another way to change Palestinians'
positions is for the Israeli peace camp to show solidarity with
them in their suffering from the occupation. This, for instance, is
the reason why these Palestinians, although against normalization
now, accept and build normal relations with the Israeli Ta'ayush
group and other Israeli groups.
Those Israelis and Palestinians in the peace camp, who are acting
together now without waiting for permanent-status issues to be
resolved, need the above- mentioned tactics and methods in order to
confront the opponents of normalization. They also need to
persevere in their efforts aimed at ending the occupation.
Endnote
1. The author wishes to express his gratitude to all the friends
who provided him with helpful comments, including the Barcelona
group, Wim Bartels, Benjamin Pogrund and Paul Scham, with a special
thank-you to Mary Schweitzer and Maia Carter Halloward (Israel) for
the voluntary initial editing of the text.
Footnotes
(1) Walid Salem, "Ishkaliat muwajahat attatbie'a," Kan'an Magazine,
Volume 56, September 1994, pp. 15-20.
In other hand a Palestinian anti-normalization academic defined
normalization to be the process of building an "ordinary (or
ostensibly ordinary) relationship between two sides that have
different powers, in a way that the weaker will be acting on the
service of the stronger." The writer differentiates between
"natural" and "ordinary," stating that the "unnatural" might become
ordinary, but it will never become "natural." The author also turns
to the cultural heritage of Great Syria, to show that normalization
is a form of domestication, meaning that "the newly emerging
behavior will become acceptable by the lord, or the side in power"
(Abdel-Sattar Qasim, Tatbi'a al-akadimiyyeen, 2 pages, no
date).
(2) For this position, see for instance Ghassan Hamdan,
Attatbi'a:Istratigiet al-ikhtiraq as-sahiouni (al-Aman Publishing
House, Beirut, 1989) (Arabic).
(3) See: Abdel Nasser Asha'er, Amaliet as-salam-
al-Falastiniyyah-al-Israeliayyah. (Center of Palestine Research
Studies, Nablus, March 1999) (Arabic).
(4) For information on this committee, see Walid Salem, "Ishkaliat
muwajahat attatbi'a," Kana'an Magazine,Volume 56. September 1994,
pp. 15-20 (Arabic).
(5) Details of Fatah position on contacts with the Israelis can be
found in: Abu- Mazen, lematha hathehe al-it -tessallat
(Arabic).
(6) Walid Salem, op. cit.
(7) Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Holt, 1993).
(8) See, for instance, al-Muwajahah (Arabic), the magazine of the
Committee to Defend the Arab National Culture, Volume11, Cairo,
June 1983; and a book published by the same committee: Thaqafat
al-muqawamah, wamuwajahat assahioni'eh (Cairo, 1990).
* Thanks to Ilan Halevi for this comment.
(9) The head of Alon Shavot Settlement Council, interview July 16,
2003.
Thanks to Menahem Klein and Riad Malki for this comment.
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