The footage of a Palestinian boy, Mohammad al-Durrah, shot dead in
his father's lap, broadcast by all Arab satellite TV stations
several times a day during the first month of the Intifada,
attracted viewers' attention and inflamed anti-Israeli sentiments.
Then, on April 6, 2002, Israel expelled the Abu Dhabi anchor and
executive producer Jassem al-Azzawi, claiming biased coverage (TBS
2002). These are just two examples of the impact of Arab satellite
TV coverage of the al-Aqsa Intifada.
While the1991 Gulf War was the first real-time televised conflict,
brought to audiences by CNN, the second Palestinian Intifada can
also claim a "first": The first televised conflict where Arab
transnational TV sets the agenda for Arab (and often Israeli)
audiences - the first comprehensive indigenous coverage of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
This can be compared to the 1987 Palestinian Intifada, when all
international and regional events were reported by Arab
government-controlled services on a limited basis (Ayish 2001).
Television broadcasters during the current Intifada appear
convinced that, to attract viewer loyalty, they should be in line
with their political expectations about national and regional
issues, particularly concerning Palestine.
This paper focuses on Arab satellite TV coverage of the second
Intifada, based on a newscast content analysis, and the author's
own observations of coverage during different periods of the
Intifada, especially during peaks of the confrontation, with an
emphasis on al-Jazeera.
I suggest that, despite the new professionalism and sleek visuals
of Arab satellite TV, the handling of perceived pan-Arab concerns,
such as the Palestinian Intifada, indicates a preference for
appealing to audiences over journalistic objectivity.
Theoretical Background
Until the early '90s, TV broadcasting in the Arab world was based
on a government monopoly model, which derived from the notion of
broadcasting as a tool of national development that should be under
government control. Under this model, broadcasting functioned as a
tool of government propaganda, rather than as an independent source
of information (Boyd 1993, Karram 1999, Ayish 2001). Operating
within ministries of information, television organizations were
funded almost exclusively from national budgets, and their
employees were viewed as part of the public-sector bureaucracy.
This was reflected by both broadcasting techniques and
content.
Nightly newscasts were the major component of television
journalism, and they were dull and monolithic in format, content,
and delivery. Television news editors selected their topics with a
view guided mainly by existing political, social, and cultural
arrangements. Political news dealing with leadership speeches,
official visits, and protocol activities always topped Arab world
TV news agendas. Other news coverage on Arab television was
dominated by government sources (Karram 1999). News formats were
characterized by serious and formal delivery methods. The visual
potential of television news was barely evident, neither was the
coverage of domestic issues outside the government agendas. In its
basic configuration, a newscast was a lineup of either very long
items dealing with leadership news or very short items dealing with
regional and international developments. Outside broadcasts were
hardly used, as the newscast drew on studio delivery (Sakr 2000).
Such a single-channel environment provided viewers with limited
exposure to regional and international television from neighboring
countries and around the world.
In this context, the natural order of Arab terrestrial TV was to
mute the Palestinian problem while emphasizing the particular
regime leader's efforts to end it. This is a much analyzed, much
commented-upon theme in Arab journalism and politics: Never show
the Palestinian problem to be bigger than the leader who claims to
speak and act on behalf of Palestinians.
In September 1991, Arab audiences had their first taste of private
satellite television when MBC went on the air from studio
facilities in London with Western-style programming. More private
broadcasters followed suit: Orbit in 1994 and ART in 1995, both
owned by Saudi businessmen based in Italy, LBC and Future
Television, both Lebanese, in 1995, and al-Jazeera from Qatar in
1996. By the end of 2002 there were more than 150 Arab satellite TV
stations, either government or privately owned, capable of reaching
every Arabic speaker in the world (Rinnawi, forthcoming). These
services brought to Arab homes not only a wider range of program
choices, but new programming genres that continue to be distinctive
features of Arab television screens. The main implication of this
development has been a dwindling of government channel audiences
and fiercer competition with print media for limited advertising
revenues.
The launching of Arab transnational commercial television has
broadened viewers' programming choices and also provided access to
new formats and styles rarely used in government-monopolized
television. Professional rather than political considerations seem
to be the driving force behind news at private stations keen on
establishing a foothold in a highly competitive media market. For
private stations, what makes news is a host of values that relate
to the event or issue and its significance for the audience. To
this end, private broadcasters have invested heavily in news
development by introducing state-of-the-art technologies and
establishing far-flung networks of reporters and correspondents.
The visual capabilities of television are highly utilized, with
rich graphics and video materials, as well as sleek delivery
formats.
Al Aqsa Intifada Coverage
During the second Intifada, Arab satellite TV has been
characterized by intense coverage of the conflict during news
hours, although in most cases the usual programming schedule has
not been altered (except during peaks of confrontation, such as in
October 2000 and April 2002). The exceptions to this have been
al-Jazeera, al-Manar (Lebanon) and New TV.
The coverage of the conflict reflects the interests of satellite
television stations, not only in conveying newsworthy events to
their viewers, but also in underscoring their desire to bring the
suffering of Palestinians under Israeli occupation to the attention
of Arab world audiences.
Objectivity, in the sense of balanced reporting of conflicting
views, seems to be virtually non-existent. A case in point is the
use of the term "martyr" for Palestinians killed by Israeli fire,
while Israelis are referred to as aggressors. Although al-Jazeera
and MBC draw on Israeli sources for information on developments in
the Occupied Territories, and feature Israeli personalities on
their news programs, the way those sources are handled by news
anchors reflects a clear disenchantment with Israel's excessive use
of force against Palestinian civilians.
Ayish's research on the five Arab transnational TV stations shows
that anti-Israel items were reported by all five services, with the
highest number of negative items reported by SSC (Syrian Satellite
Channel), Abu Dhabi (Abu Dhabi Satellite Channel) and al-Jazeera
(Ayish 2001). This supportive attitude towards Palestinian
resistance to Israeli occupation reflects the commitment of
transnational Arab TV to furthering the Palestinian cause.
Arab satellite TV has also promoted a transformation of the
Intifada to "al-Aqsa Intifada," finding its center of concern in
preserving an Arab Jerusalem - a useful, perhaps unconscious move
in appealing to a pan-Arab, mostly Muslim audience. The latest
Intifada began in the al-Aqsa compound, encouraging pan-Arab
identification with the Palestinian side of the conflict.
Arab satellite TV has also encouraged emotional reflection on the
Intifada. Songs about the Intifada and Jerusalem have been
repeatedly broadcast on all the Arab satellite channels. Even the
Lebanese channels like Future, New TV, and MTV, which usually
present light variety programs, have broadcast these types of
songs, with pictures of Mohammad al-Durrah, funerals and corpses of
victims in the background (El-Tounsy 2002). During peak times of
conflict, nationalist movies meant to remind Arabs of their dignity
are aired, such as "Nasser 56." Feature films and documentaries on
the Palestinian cause were also broadcast. All Arab satellite
stations have at some stage designated an "Open Day" for the
Intifada to fundraise for Palestinians. Programs are run under
passionate slogans such as "The Massacre" on MBC, "All of Us are
Palestine" on Abu Dhabi, or "For Your Sake" on the Abu Dhabi and
Emirates channels.
El-Tounsy (2002) points out that, during the Defensive Shield
operation in April 2002, most Arab satellite stations, with the
exception of the Egyptian, Jordanian, Kuwaiti and Saudi channels,
seemed to voice the views of their peoples. This was manifest in
escalating talk about the inefficacy of the Arab regimes and the
call for boycotting Israeli and American products and for using oil
as a weapon.
Content Analysis of Newscasts
News Items: During a two-month period focusing on al-Jazeera news,
pro-Arab and pro-Islamic attitudes were reflected in 41 items out
of a total of 86, with 24 on the Intifada. Intifada items were
normally on the newscast promo, and were the leading or second
item. In six of eight al-Jazeera newscasts, the Intifada was the
opening item. In 21 of the 24 items on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, covert and overt anti-Israeli reporting was
evident.
News Format: Twenty nine percent of al-Jazeera newscast items
dealing with the Intifada used the report format, while only 17
percent used the voice-over format, reflecting the strength of
al-Jazeera's journalists and a minimal reliance on news agencies to
provide pictures and news texts.
Attitudes Toward Selected Political Players: Besides extensive
media coverage through newscasts of the issues of the Palestinian
Intifada, al-Jazeera covered these events with a clear editorial
position. This was expressed by different parameters: time given
for these issues and language used by anchors and reporters in
describing events or giving reports using superlatives and
different sets of terms, which tended to be unbalanced on behalf of
the Palestinian side.
Air Time: Al-Jazeera lets people speak for longer than other good
news and current affairs stations would allow, particularly in live
interviews. In particular, it virtually gives a free platform to
the PA and local leaders. This is not a flaw in and of itself -
clearly Arab audiences are willing to hear such people speak if
al-Jazeera has continued to use this policy. However, Israeli
spokespeople and "antagonistic" parties are not normally provided a
free platform or a sympathetic host asking simple questions.
Who Speaks - Official Voices: Whether due to the sensitivities of
Israeli army spokespeople appearing on camera, problems of access
to their physical locations or a perceived unimportance, Israeli
sources are cited far less frequently than Palestinian sources, and
when they are cited they are usually juxtaposed with what
Palestinians have said. Al-Jazeera could do more to include more
Israeli voices, to actually allow their faces to appear more
frequently on screen and to allow them more time to speak. Allowing
Israelis to speak on al-Jazeera seems to be the individual
prerogative of al-Jazeera reporters, rather than station
policy.
How Facts Become Facts
Gathering facts is a precarious business in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. While many Anglo-European journalists tend to head
straight for the IDF offices to check with English speakers on
Palestinian deaths, occasionally rounded down to the lowest
believable figure, without a name, story or history, al-Jazeera
heads for opposite logical sources: hospitals and civil society
institutions. However, Palestinian institutions, such as hospitals,
Red Crescent workers and eyewitnesses, do make mistakes, although
they are the best first point of contact.
Context and Binaries
Individual Arab satellite TV journalists have tended to create a
background with subtle binaries indicating who is right and wrong,
who is most likely to tell the truth, and conversely, to lie, and
who the victims and aggressors are. In terms of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, these assumptions are easily built
into the audience's own worldview, based on their own backgrounds,
and the fact that the journalist is one of them. Satellite TV
journalists reporting from the Israel-Palestinian conflict are,
indeed, Palestinians who live the circumstances they report.
When Walid al-Omari is reporting, and a missile lands close by,
this is not scripted (although it will inevitably be included in
the final edit). Or when Shirin Abu 'Aqleh is literally marooned in
the al-Jazeera office in Ramallah, reporting for 12 to 18 hours a
day because the other journalists cannot leave their houses, and
she receives a fax that soldiers have entered the building and are
stationed on the floor beneath her, there is a sense of immediacy,
legitimacy and feeling to the reports. This creates given binaries,
emphasized through the very circumstances al-Jazeera reporters
live, and then through background reports.
Sensationalism
It is in this context that al-Jazeera is often accused of
sensationalism: reporting live from funerals, sites of conflict,
filming dead bodies and the ubiquitous checkpoints dividing up
Palestinian territories and lives. Ayish (2001) uses the example of
the footage (played and replayed) of the Palestinian child Mohammed
Al-Durrah being shot dead while cowering in his father's lap, which
was used to attract viewers' attention and inflame anti-Israeli
sentiments. Ajami (2001) argues that the second Intifada was a
Godsend for al-Jazeera, with attractive visual shots of masked
Palestinian boys aiming slingshots and stones at Israeli soldiers,
making for compelling television.
While most observers of the Arab media argue the new transnational
media is a positive development, and will improve the negative
image of Israel among Arab audiences, I suggest that this medium is
strengthening a negative image of Israel, making the conflict more
salient and live through sensationalism in the short term. However,
in the long term, a process of normalization has already begun,
which, once the conflict abates, will continue to work to create a
spirit of openness about Israel - both negative and positive but,
essentially, placing Israel firmly in Arab consciousness and on the
Arab political map.
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Boyd, D. 1993. Broadcasting in the Arab World: A Survey of
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El Tounsy, A. 2002. "Reflections on the Arab Satellites, the
Palestinian Intifada, and the Israeli War" In TBS No. 8.
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Karam, G.1999. Arab Media in the 21 Century. Beirut, Lebanon.
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