Why is it that the U.S. administration, though clearly disagreeing
with Netanyahu's handling of the peace process, refrains from
coming out squarely against the Israeli government's views?
This recurring question has no simple answer. There are, of course,
the traditional ties between the U.S. and the State of Israel,
based on common democratic values, on a shared attachment to the
Bible and, hence, on the Jewish people's destiny as the history of
the "children of Israel" is being told in the Old Testament. A
major factor strengthening these ties is joint strategic and other
interests: a U.S. senator once quipped that the yearly grant of $3
billion to Israel is a "real bargain" if one takes into
consideration that Israel is the biggest unsinkable aircraft
carrier of the U.S. in the Middle East.
But American financial assistance to Israel has lately been losing
much of its relative importance. A recent visit of Israel's finance
minister (March 1998) to the United States underscored the
limitations of America's leverage over Israel. Finance Minister
Yaakov Ne'eman proposed a gradual phasing out of U.S. civilian aid
to Israel. The details have still to be worked out, but what
matters is the principle. The whole scheme would have been
unthinkable if Israel's financial dependency on the United States
had not been dramatically reduced in recent years. When Israel's
gross national product (GNP) did not exceed $15 billion per year,
the $3 billion it received annually from the United States
represented 20 percent of the GNP, a significant amount. Even then,
the U.S.A. rarely took advantage of its financial clout to
"convince" Israeli policymakers to heed its views. Today, when
Israel's GNP exceeds $65 billion, the $3-billion annual grant
amounts to less than 5 percent and the ability of the White House
to put pressure on Israel has practically vanished.
Moreover, U.S. arms industries have powerful vested interests in
the maintenance of the yearly American military aid ($1.8 billion)
to Israel, one of its best clients. One must add the traditionally
pro-Israel bias of the American Congress and AI Gore's need for the
support - both financial and political - of AIPAC, the pro-Israel
lobby, in order to improve his chances of winning the next
presidential election. Bearing these factors in mind, one perceives
the limits of Clinton's capacity to impose his views on Israel's
present government.
In such a situation, even suggesting an American compromise between
opposing Israeli and Palestinian positions becomes a Herculean
task. Netanyahu succeeded in mobilizing the Conference of
Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations in the United States
against any American proposal made publicly. "It's one thing to
suggest an American compromise formula privately to Israel's prime
minister for consideration, but to make this suggestion publicly is
an impermissible form of pressure that shall be opposed by us,"
said Sam Salberg, chairman of the Presidents Conference, after
talking to Netanyahu. Is it surprising that in these circumstances,
Martin Indyk, head of the State Department Middle East desk,
recently served notice that the United States may well renounce its
mediation efforts altogether?
The United States still possesses some margin for maneuvering.
During the 1978 Camp David discussions, the negotiations became
bogged down at one point by Mr. Menachem Begin's insistence on some
fine juridical points. In spite of the objections of his colleagues
Ezer Weizman and Moshe Dayan, Begin refused to budge. Carter took
aside Begin and his closest assistants and told them bluntly that,
if the talks were to fail, he would tell the Congress and the media
who was to blame for the failure. Upon resumption of the
discussions with Anwar Sadat, Begin dropped his intransigent
stance.
The U.S. administration disposes of other weighty arguments. If
Clinton really becomes tired of Netanyahu's double-talk and
foot-dragging, he may hint to Israel's leaders that the U.S.A.
could abandon its automatic veto against any and all resolutions
critical of Israel put before the U.N. Security Council. American
abstention on Security Council resolutions condemning Israeli
policies could have far-reaching consequences, especially if
non¬compliance with those resolutions results in the vote of
sanctions against the State of Israel. In the meantime, all this
today seems extremely unlikely, far¬fetched, almost
unthinkable. And if one takes the pain to analyze American Middle
East policies over the last thirty years, one cannot but come to
the conclusion that the ambiguous U.S. stand on the Palestinian
question has been preventing Washington from formulating a clear
policy on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
To this very day, the U.S.A. has not recognized the Palestine
people's right to national self-determination, to statehood,
alongside Israel, in mutually accepted frontiers. American policy
on this crucial matter lags behind the stand of almost all its
European and Asian allies and facilitates Netanyahu's delaying
tactics.
There is a tragic dimension to the present deadlock in the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. All are aware, including the
Israeli government, that the continuation of the impasse may well
lead to an explosion in the West Bank and Gaza where Palestinian
frustration and despair are building up to a level of volatility
endangering the stability of the entire region. Still, not a single
Israeli minister, not even Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai,
whose three-month deadline for an additional Israeli redeployment
in the West Bank has long since passed, is willing to confront
Netanyahu's immobility and topple his government through
resignation.
The issue becomes particularly crucial as Israel's policies of
procrastination may eventually put the whole Middle East on fire,
thus threatening the major interests of the U.S. and other
countries with the disruption of the regular flow of oil to the
industrialized world.
Israeli political and military experts are warning that time is
rapidly running out - to no avail. Carter knew how to deal with a
reluctant Begin at Camp David. Will Clinton be able (and willing)
to muster the same political courage when confronted with
Netanyahu's stubbornness?