It is clear to regional and international powers involved in
peacemaking in the Middle East that the peace process has long been
in the throes of a fatal crisis and is now verging on total
collapse.
Prior to the defeat of the Labor party in the Israeli elections of
1996, the peace process was completely paralyzed on the
Syrian-Israeli and the Lebanese-Israeli tracks. With the Likud
victory in these elections, this paralysis subsequently spread to
the Palestinian-Israeli track. There was a shift in Israeli policy
which was not to the liking of the United States. But instead of
circumspection at the White House, the State Department and the
lobbies of the American Congress, the head of the Israeli
government, Mr. Binyamin Netanyahu, enjoyed a warm reception by
Congress and got a standing ovation for his speech. He raised the
banner of "Security for peace" instead of the concept of "Land for
peace" which the United Nations and the American administration had
adopted and on which the whole peace process was predicated.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright admitted that 1997 was a bad
year for the peace process, without attributing responsibility for
the failure. She failed to proffer her own vision of mechanisms
that would extricate the peace process from its predicament. Mr.
Yasser Arafat concurred with her negative assessment of the
situation, but laid the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of
the Likud government. According to him, rescuing the peace process
depended on Mr. Netanyahu taking concrete steps towards the
implementation of the agreements that had been signed between
Palestinians and Israelis. Arafat stressed the implementation of
the Hebron Protocol and its attachments - the Mutual Undertakings -
related to the stages of withdrawal, the three redeployments (two
of which have long been overdue), the operation of the airport at
Dahaniyah, the completion of the construction of the Gaza port and
the release of prisoners. The Likud government failed to honor its
commitment to the agreements it signed, even if witnessed by
President Clinton, proof of the weakness of the Americans as
patrons of the peace process.
The activities in recent months of the untiring U.s. Special Middle
East Coordinator, Dennis Ross, and Mrs. Albright's meetings with
the Palestinians and the Israelis have remained largely fruitless.
The talks have but underscored the fact that, instead of giving new
impetus to the peace process, the Hebron agreement became a
negative factor, casting doubt about the very future of the
negotiations. Mrs. Albright's implicit admission of these painful
facts was probably instrumental in her suspending her visits to the
region at the beginning of 1998.
As for Netanyahu, he exploited Albright's dilly-dallying and issued
orders for bulldozers to proceed to Jabal Abu Ghneim/Har Homa for
the construction of a settlement there. Negotiations stopped and
the peace process on the Palestinian-Israeli track was frozen.
Instead of forcing Netanyahu to withdraw from Jabal Abu Ghneim/Har
Homa, the American administration acted with leniency and did not
even compel him to implement the first stage of pullback due during
the first week of March 1997. He later evaded implementing the
second stage of redeployment which had been slated for September
1997. Once again, he infringed on the American concept of
peacemaking in the area and reversed the peace process.
At the time, declarations were made by the State Department
pointing to disagreement with Netanyahu's position. Indeed,
President Clinton gave public voice to his disconcertment with the
Israeli government's position and there were even leaks by some
American officials about the lack of chemistry between Netanyahu
and Clinton. President Clinton declined to meet with Netanyahu
during one of the latter's visits to the United States, yet the
American administration did nothing to pressure Netanyahu to adjust
to the American position. Instead, they called on the Arabs to be
patient with Netanyahu, and to understand the difficulties he was
facing on the domestic front. In fact, Dennis Ross later attempted
to promote Netanyahu's policy rather than to abort it. He tried to
convince the Palestinians to go to final-status negotiations before
the completion of the interim stage. The proposal was firmly
rejected by PA President Arafat, on the grounds that it conflicted
with the letter and spirit of the peace process and the agreements
signed between Palestinians and Israelis.
Objectively, no one can deny the great successes of American
diplomacy in more than one part of the world during President
Clinton's term: the former Soviet Union conceded defeat; the
European countries that are members of the U.N., as well as
Germany, Russia and Japan have been compelled to accept a
marginalized role for themselves and for the U.N. They are pressed
to accept the exclusive involvement of the United States in the
Arab-Israeli conflict in accordance with its own global strategy.
But, unfortunately, the important achievements of the American
Administration following Oslo have evaporated, and I do not think
it unfair to say that during the Clinton¬Christopher-Albright
era the American administration was responsible for the loss of two
precious years in the life of the Middle East peace process. As
sponsor of the process, the U.S. had firmly rejected an equal
sharing with other countries of the responsibility for its fate.
Thus, it alone is responsible for the accumulation of negative
developments in the region and for a loss of confidence by the Arab
countries in the peace process and its future. U.S. inactivity has
also been instrumental in nurturing the enemies of peace on both
sides. Exploiting the deterioration in the peace process and the
erosion in its benefits, they have entrenched themselves among both
Palestinian and Israeli populations, without the need for direct
coordination between them. It will be very difficult for the U.S.
to recover from the loss of credibility vis-a-vis the people of the
Middle East.
The American administration is fully aware that its role as patron
of the peace process has become more complicated in the wake of the
political crisis created by the resignation of David Levy, the
Israeli foreign minister. Irrespective of the motives, personal and
partisan, that led Levy to resign or of Netanyahu's motives in
letting his foreign minister resign, it is clear that Netanyahu's
government has shifted towards greater extremism. Its progress
towards peace with the Palestinians has become more constrained
than ever by the radical elements within the Likud party, the
religious camp and in the Israeli street. The capacity of its
leader - assuming he is convinced ¬to adapt to American wishes
regarding the implementation of the interim stage of the peace
process has grown weaker. His major preoccupation at the moment is
to safeguard the ruling coalition within his government, to counter
the opposition, and to stay in power as long as possible. This he
can achieve only if he accedes to the demands of the settlers and
extremist elements that call for no withdrawal from "the God-given
Holy Land" and by land confiscation and settlement expansion.
The U.S. as Patron of the Peace Process
The U.S. has a very narrow definition of its role as patron of the
peace process, which it has basically confined to procedural rather
than substantive matters. The impression is that it lacks a clear
political vision. This has affected its international standing, has
undermined its capacity to influence the conflicting parties in the
area and has cost the peace process its dynamics. Clearly, to
extract the peace process from the quagmire it is in, the Clinton
Administration must recognize that the achievement of peace and
stability in the area is in the interest of America and the
international community, no less than it is an Arab or Israeli
interest. Experience shows that all previous American
administrations, when they felt the vital interests of the U.S.
threatened, took a firm stand regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict
and were able to come up with their own recommendations and to
impose their own positions on the conflicting parties. This is what
happened in 1956-57 when the U.S. forced Ben-Gurion to withdraw his
troops from Sinai and the Gaza Strip, and after the October 1973
war when Kissinger succeeded in making Israel withdraw from
important areas of Arab lands. The same thing occurred in 1982 when
Reagan pressured Begin into a swift troop withdrawal from Beirut,
and later in 1991 when Bush talked Shamir into not retaliating
against Iraq for the missiles that fell on Israel during the Gulf
War. The coming stages in the peace process do not allow for a weak
and hesitant American role.
To break the stalemate, Mrs. Albright will have to cease
procrastination and to reassume the initiative, shifting from
"managing" the crisis of the Arab-Israeli conflict to solving it.
She will have to present defined proposals and practical and
tangible solutions. This will convince the parties of the
advantages of pursuing the peace process, and of the price to be
paid should they revert to the pre-negotiations stage.
Replacing the present U.S. Special Coordinator, Dennis Ross, might
be of help, especially since he bears a big share in the
deterioration of the American role in the peace process. In fact,
Israelis and Palestinians - the two parties in the conflict - have
come to act according to a preconceived notion of his positions and
a thorough knowledge of the limits of his tactics and maneuvers,
and it is no secret that the Palestinian side has ceased to see any
practical use to his visits. It is imperative that the State
Department recognize the great importance of the element of time in
the negotiations and that it impose a scrupulous respect of the
timetables as determined by the agreements and to which Ross has
paid scant attention.
If, during the rule of the Labor party, Palestinians and Israelis
did not feel a need for a decisive U.S. role in the negotiations,
during the Likud rule, however, 18 months of faltering negotiations
underscore the need for a third party. This means that the American
administration should change its concept of the role of sponsorship
and should participate as a full partner along the lines of what
happened during the Egyptian-Israeli talks before and after the
signing of the Camp David Accords. This role should not be confined
to matters of security only, as is the case now, but should extend
to all the issues presented at the negotiating table.
Mrs. Albright has talked more than once about the possibility of a
joint American-European initiative which, in my opinion, is largely
overdue. Allowing its European allies to act according to their own
convictions could contribute towards saving the peace process and
providing the driving force to surmount the huge obstacles that lie
ahead.
Also, it would be in the interest of the American administration
not to bow to Netanyahu's inflexibility regarding an Egyptian role
in the negotiations. Since Sadat's rule and up to this day, the
facts show that the Egyptian role has been consistently positive,
aimed at finding radical, just and lasting solutions to the
problems of the conflict. Alienating or antagonizing Egyptian
involvement, as Netanyahu is doing at the moment, is detrimental to
the peace process.
The U.S. an Unbiased Mediator?
If American bias in favor of Israel can be accepted by certain
segments of the Palestinian people who try to understand its
motives and background, the realities of six years of peacemaking
in the area have proven that such partiality can be harmful when it
oversteps its limits. Excessive pampering of the Israeli extremists
and a humiliation of the Palestinians can only encourage Netanyahu
to make light of the role of the American patron as well as of
other international powers, of the Palestinian partnership and of
all agreements signed with them. By the same token, a more
impartial United States can put a check to the rise of extremism
inside Israeli society or in the region as a whole.
The call for the American administration to reduce its pro-Israeli
bias does not necessarily mean a confrontation with Netanyahu and
his government. If, for reasons of its own, the Clinton
Administration is reluctant to engage in a head-on confrontation
with the Likud government, it can allow U.N. institutions to playa
role in the peace process and facilitate their task in promoting
stability in the region, including the possibility of dispatching
peace-keeping forces along the borders that will be separating the
State of Israel and the territories of the future Palestinian
state.
At the end of the day, the U.S. remains the only country that can
impact on the decisions taken by the Israeli government because of
the nature of its historic relations with Israel - government,
people and parties. The Israeli street is quite sensitive to this
relationship and to the American stands and interests. All Israeli
governments and parties have generally tried to avoid confrontation
with the White House. The problem lies not in the capacity of the
American administration to influence Netanyahu's position, but in
the extent to which the White House is willing to use its
mechanisms of pressure. When the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein,
or the Libyan president, Muammar Qaddafi, rebelled against the
U.S., we all saw the American response. Netanyahu rebelled against
American policy, but nothing happened to convince the Arab nations
of the evenhandedness of American policy. There were many occasions
on which the American administration witnessed Netanyahu's
subterfuge and his attempts to abort American diplomacy and to
undermine its credibility. Nonetheless, the Clinton Administration
chose to turn a blind eye and allowed the Israeli government to
proceed with bolstering its military superiority and its settlement
activity, instead of engaging in a serious search for a lasting
peace with the Arabs and the Palestinians.
Mrs. Albright has already lost a whole year [1997] failing to make
any efforts towards peacemaking in this troubled part of the world.
She has visited a few of the countries in the area only once. Will
she change her style in 1998 and assume her responsibilities more
efficiently? Or will she find herself compelled to visit the area,
but this time to put out the conflagrations, large and small, that
will have erupted in more than one comer of this region because of
an American policy of deferring vital decisions?