From the Report of the King-Crane Commission appointed by U.S. President W. Wilson, August 30, 1919. (The report was partially published in 1922, and fully in 1947.)

If the strict terms of the Balfour Declaration are adhered to - favoring "the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine" ¬it can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist program must be greatly modified. For "a national home for the Jewish people" is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities" [ ... ] the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.
No British officer consulted by the Commissioners believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms. That in itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist program on the part of the non-Jewish population of Palestine and Syria.

Congressional Resolution Favoring the Establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, 1922:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That the U.S.A. favors the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for: the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings shall be adequately protected. Approved Sept. 21, 1922.
A Resolution Concerning the Development of a Jewish National Home in Palestine was Adopted by the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York, March 8, 1943. Between May 1939 and July 1944, some nineteen state legislatures in the U.S.A. adopted similar resolutions.

Letter by Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the U.S., to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurian, November 7-8, 1956:
Statements (have been) attributed to your Government to the effect that Israel does not intend to withdraw from Egyptian territory, as requested by the United Nations. The V.S. views these reports, if true, with deep concern (they) would seriously undermine the urgent efforts being made by the V.N. to restore peace in the Middle East, and could not but bring about the condemnation of Israel as a violator of the principles as well as the directives of the U.N. It would be a matter of the greatest regret to all my countrymen if Israeli policy on a matter of such grave concern to the world should in any way impair the friendly cooperation between our countries.

Declaration Respecting the Baghdad Pact between the U.S.A. and Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and the U.K., July 28, 1958:
Under the Pact, collective security arrangements have been instituted. Joint military planning has been advanced and area economic projects have been promoted ... the nations represented reaffirmed their determination to strengthen further their united defense posture in the area ... Artic1e 1 of the Pact of Mutural Co-operation signed at Baghdad on February 4, 1955, provided that the parties will cooperate for their security and defense.

Letter from U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers to Mahmoud Riad, Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, June 19, 1970:
The U.S. puts forward the following proposals for consideration of the U.A.R.:
(a) that both Israel and the V.A.R. subscribe to a restoration of the cease-fire for at least a limited period;
(b) that Israel and the V.A.R. (as well as Israel and Jordan) subscribe to a statement in the form of a report from Ambassador Jarring to Secretary General V Thant:
(a) that having accepted and expressed their willingness to carry out Resolution 242 in all its parts, they will (enter) discussions held under my auspices;
(b) (the) purpose is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace based on (1) mutual acknowledgment by the V.A.R. Gordan) and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and (2) Israel's withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with Resolution 242.
I am sending a similar message to Foreign Minister Rifa'i (of Jordan).

U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, November 22, 1967

The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East; Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security; Emphasizing further that all Member states in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter;
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of the Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity
a. for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
b. for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
c. for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles and in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 338, October 22, 1973

The Security Council,
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

The Reagan Peace Plan, from an Address by the President, September I, 1982:

I call upon Israel to make clear that the security for which she yearns can only be achieved through genuine peace. I call on the Palestinian people to recognize that their own political aspirations are inextricably bound to recognition of Israel's right to a secure future. And I call on the Arab states to recognize the reality of Israel. The United States has a special responsibility. No other nation is in a position to deal with the parties to the conflict on the basis of trust and reliability. Israel exists; it has a right to exist in peace behind secure and defensible borders and to demand of its neighbors that they recognize these facts.
The departure of Palestinians from Beirut dramatizes more than ever the hopelessness of the Palestinian people. Their cause is more than a question of refugees. The Camp David agreement recognized that fact when it spoke of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.
As outlined in the Camp David Accords, the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will have full autonomy over their own affairs [providing] that this poses no threat to Israel's security. The U.S. will not support the additional use of land for the purpose of settlements during the transition period. The immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel could create [ ... ] confidence. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel....
Beyond the transition period, peace cannot be achieved by the formation of an independent Palestinian State. Nor is it achievable on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza. So the U.S. will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza and we will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel. Self-government of the Palestinians in association with Jordan offers chances for a durable, just and lasting peace. Jerusalem must remain undivided but its final status should be decided by negotiations. America's commitment to the security of Israel is iron-clad.

From the Camp David Accords between Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, witnessed by Jimmy Carter, September 17, 1978

A. West Bank and Gaza.
(a) There should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy for the inhabitants, the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the military government. The government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government and to the legitimate security interests of the parties involved.
(b) Egypt, Israel and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. An agreement will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. Internal and external security and public order [will be assured]. A strong local police force will be established which may include Jordanian citizens. Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.
(c) As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. These negotiations will be conducted between Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza [ ... ] based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future ....
B. Egypt-Israel. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with the goal of signing within three months a peace treaty between them, while inviting other parties to the conflict to negotiate similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area.
C. Associated Principles. Peace treaties between Israel and of each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon - should [involve] full recognition, abolishing economic boycotts, the protection of the due process of law. The U.S. shall be invited to participate in the talks on implementation. The U.N. Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties.

President Carter's Statement on Recognition of Palestinians, Aswan, Egypt, January 4, 1987:
The Egyptian-Israeli peace initiative must succeed. There is no good reason why accommodations cannot be reached.
In my own private discussions with both Arab and Israeli leaders, I have been deeply impressed by the unanimous desire for peace. My presence here today is a direct result of the courageous initiative which President Sadat undertook in his recent trip to Jerusalem.
We believe that there are certain principles which must be observed before a just and comprehensive peace can be achieved:
• Normal relations - peace means more than just an end to belligerency;
• Withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied in 1967 and agreement on secure and recognized borders for all parties in the context of normal and peaceful relations in accordance with U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338.
There must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The problem must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future.

Statement by Secretary of State Designate James Baker, January 17, 1989:

The Arab-Jewish conflict has long engaged America's attention, resources and good-will. Our mediation has born partial fruit in the Egyptian¬-Israeli Peace Treaty, part of the Camp David Accords for a comprehensive settlement. And our policy in the Middle East has been truly bipartisan. Every administration has made its contribution. I was proud to be a part of the Reagan team that expanded our relationship with Israel into a true strategic alliance and that also met our responsibilities in the Persian Gulf.
Now President Reagan has authorized a dialog with the PLO after Yasser Arafat declared his organization's recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace, supported U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced terrorism. And we are bringing a message to the PLO about terrorism and about the need for even more realism. But the existence of the dialog should not lead anyone to misunderstand our overall policy, or question our enduring support for the State of Israel.
As President Bush has described it, the objectives and means include an enduring peace that ensures Israel's security and satisfies the legitimate rights of the Palestinians (and) the exchange of territory for peace. Jordan must playa part in any agreement. The Palestinians must participate in the determination of their own future. We continue to believe, however, that an independent Palestinian state will not be a source of stability or contribute to a just and enduring peace.

From an Address by Vice-President Bush to B'nai Brith, Baltimore, September 7, 1988:

Back in 1980 we had an idea called "Israel- Strategic Ally" ... today it is clear that we can have an alliance with Israel and still pursue better relations with other countries in the area ... today, the U.S. and Israel are engaged in joint planning on mutual threats in the Mediterranean ... eight years ago a former President regarded Israel as a strategic liability - can you figure that? - not as an asset to U.S. action in the Middle East.
These (are the) principles. First, U.S.-Israeli cooperation is fundamental to our strategic interests. Second, peace will be achieved through direct negotiations between the parties. We will not be party ... to deny Israel's legitimacy or to force her to accept a bad deal. Third, the purpose of a negotiation is real peace. Fourth, the Palestinians must be involved at every step in the negotiations. There will be no peace without them. As for the PLO, I will insist that it accept U.N. Resolution 242, recognize Israel's existence, abandon terrorism, and change its Covenant calling for Israel's destruction, before we have any discussions with that organization. I have made it very clear that I am opposed to a Palestinian state (as) a threat to the security of Israel and of Jordan (and) contrary to American interests. The creation of a Palestinian state will not lead to peace but neither will an annexation of the territories by Israel or their permanent control by military occupation.

From an Interview with Secretary of State Shulz, Jerusalem, April 3, 1988:

(On the meeting of March 26 at the State Department with Professors Edward Sa'id and Abu-Lughud) They are not members of the PLO and as far as the U.S. is concerned, we will not talk to the PLO unless it recognizes Israel's right to exist, gets away from this notion of armed struggle of terrorism and recognizes Resolutions 242 and 338. These men represent themselves and the Palestinian National Council. As we talk, it's quite clear that they are men of peace and they want to see negotiations take place with Israel.

Schulz on Jerusalem, April 5, 1988:

The position of the U.S. is that Jerusalem should remain a unified city, not be divided, be unified. Exactly how the status of that should work is an appropriate subject for negotiations. In that sense, it fits within the 242 definition .. .I have the feeling that most people feel it should be unified.

Schulz on the Question of a Palestinian State, April 8, 1988:

The Palestinian people have to be represented in these negotiations from the beginning (to make it) possible for their views to be legitimately very much a part of this process. I believe that can be done in a Jordanian-¬Palestinian delegation. (There must be) some way for people who identify themselves as Palestinians to do that while being federated with states that have the structure and the size and the tradition to be a workable governing unit and there is lots of experience with that sort of thing all over the world.

From the U.S. Letter of Assurances to Palestinians, October 18, 1991:

The Palestinian decision to attend a peace conference [at Madrid co-sponsored by the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, along with the European Community and a U.N. observer - Ed.] to launch direct negotiations with Israel represents an important step in the search for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region. As President Bush has stated in his March 6, 1991, address to Congress, the U.S. continues to believe firmly (in) the U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. Such an outcome must also provide for security and recognition for all states in the region, including Israel, and for the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people. Anything else, the President noted, would fail the twin tests of fairness and security.
The U.S. does not seek to determine who speaks for Palestinians in this process ... we believe that a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation offers the most promising pathway for achieving the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people ... we want to assure you that nothing Palestinians do in choosing their delegation in this phase of the process will affect their claim to East Jerusalem (whose) final status will be decided by negotiations. Thus we do not recognize Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem ... Palestinians from East Jerusalem should be entitled to participate by voting in the elections for an interim self-governing authority.

From the Remarks of US President Bill Clinton at the White House Ceremony with Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat for the Signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles, September 13, 1993:

Ever since Harry Truman first recognized Israel, every American President, Democrat and Republican, has worked for peace between Israel and her neighbors. Now the security of the Israeli people will be reconciled with the hopes of the Palestinian people, and there will be more security and more hope for all. Today, the leadership of Israel and the PLO will sign a declaration of principles on interim Palestinian self-government. It charts a course of reconciliation between two peoples who have both known the bitterness of exile … I pledge the active support of the U.S.A. to the difficult work that lies ahead. The U.S. is committed to ensuring that the people who are affected by this agreement will be made more secure by it...for too long the young in the Middle East have been taught from the chronicles of war. Now we can give them the chance to know the season of peace.

The Middle East Peace Process in the 1990s - from a U.S. State Department Fact Sheet, November 29, 1993:

The current phase of the process was launched at the Madrid Conference convened by the U.S.A. and the former Soviet Union from October 30 through November 1, 1991. The co-sponsors' letter of invitation laid out the framework for the negotiations, including: a just and comprehensive peace settlement based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; direct bilateral negotiations on two tracks between Israel and the Arab States and between Israel and the Palestinians; multilateral negotiations on regionwide issues such as arms control and regional security, water, refugees, environment and economic development. These are now conducted on four tracks: Israel-Syria, Israel-Lebanon, Israel-Jordan and Israel-Palestine.
The first major breakthrough occurred on the Israel-Palestinian track. Israel and the PLO conducted secret negotiations, in parallel with the Washington talks, which culminated in the signing of the Declaration of Principles in Washington, D.C. on September 13, 1993. As part of the agreement, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. For its part, the PLO recognized Israel's right to live in peace and security, accepted U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced the use of terrorism and violence ... The U.S.A. has pledged to support the parties' efforts to implement the Israel-PLO agreement...Secretary of State Christopher has said: "The implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement represents only part of a larger task in the Middle East. We must seek a comprehensive reconciliation between Israel and the rest of the Arab world, between the peoples of Israel and the peoples of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon."

Editors' note: Meanwhile, the Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan was signed on October 26, 1994. Following up on the Oslo Accords came the Cairo Treaty of May 4, 1994, on Gaza-Jericho autonomy and the Oslo II agreement of September 28, 1995, on the second stage of Palestinian autonomy.

These extracts were chosen by the Editors of the Journal from longer documents, because of their particular relevance to the subject. They do not necessarily express the whole content of the documents. For the most part, only American documents appear here and not those of the United Nations, etc.

Sources: Documents, ed. John Norton Moore, Princeton Univ. Press, 1974; Documents on the Arab-Israel Conflict, ed. Yehuda Lukaca, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984; Arab-Israeli Conflict - American Foreign Policy Documents, Dept. of State, Washington, 1986; Passia Diary, Jerusalem 1994, 1995, 1996; The Season of Peace, US Information Agency, 1994.