Water is considered the most important factor leading to
instability and conflict in the Middle East region. Recent analyses
and reports point to the fact that the problem of water will get
much more complicated than will be within the capacity of politics
to deal with it. This is primarily because the problem goes in
conjunction with the natural features of the region: dry and
desert. Indeed, the desert covers 60 percent of Israel, 70 percent
of Syria, 85 percent of Jordan and 90 percent of Egypt.
The Middle East also has one of the biggest alimentation gaps;
consequently, agricultural expansion to bridge those gaps in the
years to come will require large quantities of water, parallel to
the highest average of population growth in the world.
To give an idea of the dimension of the water problem in the Arab
world: Water requirements are calculated on a minimum basis known
as "minimum water requirement" (MWR) which is 1,000 cubic
meters/year (CM/Yr). The population of the Arab world is presently
nearing 235 million; the quantity of available water per person is
about 750 CM/Yr, which is below the MWR. If the population reaches
295 million by the year 2000, then a person's share of water will
drop to 575 CM. If the average population growth is 25 per
thousand, then the water requirement will reach 295 billion CM by
the year 2000, i.e., a deficit of 120 billion CM.
Israel's water crisis in the 1990s constitutes the foremost
external threat to Arab water security. Israel's inability to
satisfy the rising water needs of its settlements and agricultural
projects leads it to try to control neighboring water sources. In
addition, the Arab countries face a crisis with Turkey over the
water of the Euphrates, and the Ethiopian Nile projects.
The Palestinian-Israeli water problem is tied to Israel's own water
problem, on the one hand, and to Israeli political thought, on the
other. Israeli political tradition in the area of water is confined
to three basic axes. The first is the economic dimension, where the
agriculture lobby is distinctly influential. For example, most of
those who have held the position of general water commissioner came
from agricultural kibbutzim, and while agriculture consumes 73
percent of the total available water sources, its contribution to
the Israeli gross national product does not exceed 3.7
percent.
The second axis is the Israeli horizontal and urban development in
the 1970s, especially following the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the absorption of huge numbers of immigrants into the country.
These come from countries where water shortages are virtually
unknown and, consequently, their social activities and domestic
habits require a high consumption of water not in keeping with the
Israeli water situation.
The third axis is Israel's conception that a control of water
sources by Palestinians carries implications of sovereignty,
especially with regard to the Jordan River and Palestinian water
rights.
The formation of a water committee within the framework of
multilateral negotiations attests to the importance of this subject
in bolstering the peace process, as well as in achieving people's
aspirations towards comfort and economic prosperity in the
region.
Progress in multilateral negotiations is directly connected with
progress on the bilateral track. This is especially so because,
according to Palestinian understanding, the issue of water is
primarily political. Multilateral negotiations are conceived as an
academic exercise of technical use, but lack the competence to
advance a solution to the essence of the water problem.
The Multilateral Negotiations
Multilateral negotiations have, since the outset, been restricted
to progress in bilateral talks, and were greatly affected by them.
Most of the discussions of the water committees have, so far, been
confined to a technical framework, and revolved around four
subjects: the means for the exchange of technical information among
the countries of the region; the means for developing water
resources and water administration; regional cooperation, and joint
administration.
Their technical nature notwithstanding, it should be noted that the
Palestinians view multilateral negotiations as an acceptable
procedure from a psychological perspective, as they entail their
sitting together with other parties and arriving at a mutual
understanding. But the absence of Syria and Lebanon from these
talks has hindered this understanding. Thus another formula has to
be found which can be updated to ensure the participation of both
these countries. Moreover, an update of the multilaterals agenda
will help extricate them from their academic nature, in order to
tackle problems of essence.
The Bilateral Negotiations
The gist of the bilateral rounds of talks about water is contained
in Article 40 which was signed on September 18, 1995, within the
framework of the general Palestinian-Israeli agreement, signed in
Taba on the same date. This article contains basic points and
headings that might prove useful for future action, but it has no
bearing on mechanisms for a radical solution to the problem. That
is why I can say that what has been achieved in Article 40 contains
a number of positive points, provided these are implemented
according to the Palestinian understanding of them. Indeed, a great
divergence exists between the Israeli and Palestinian understanding
of the agreement, which, in certain clauses, are diametrically
opposed.
The following table shows the extent of discrepancy between the two
sides, even in basic issues:
Palestinian Israeli Degree of Subject
Understanding Understanding Clarity in
Agreement
water rights are fixed to be negotiated general and water
rights
ambiguous
not crystallized commercial basis unclear water prices
has limited powers has extensive powers complicated function
of
details joint committee
Palestinian Israeli unclear responsibility
for sources
joint-Palestinian joint clear responsibility for
supply
Thus, lack of clarity and ambiguity are among the obstacles to the
implementation of the basic agreement. In addition, it does not
provide for a mechanism leading to a total resolution of the water
problem and is an escape from basic issues, such as the definition
of the meaning of "rights," and the meaning of "control," and does
not refer to the problem of the Jordan River.
Furthermore, a basic drawback of the agreement is the fact that it
retained the formulation of the Gaza-Jericho agreement, signed in
August 1994 which, from a technical perspective, has a bad
reputation among Palestinian experts. This is due to several
reasons: water allocation for settlers stayed as is; the water
sources in the Gaza Strip remained subject to available information
on the water of settlements; and the water supply problem continued
to be confined to a commercial dimension based on the concessions
for the Israeli Mekorot water company.
The General Framework for Negotiations over Water in the
Final-Status Talks
What gains or losses have been achieved through this agreement is
immaterial at this point. What is important now is to find a
general framework for negotiations about a final settlement for the
problem of water. That is why it is necessary to lay down the main
definitions for a Palestinian strategy of negotiation in the final
stage, before the delineation of any technical framework:
1. The issue of Palestinian water rights, especially in the Jordan
River, is one of political sovereignty, and a major feature of a
future state, and not only a question of water shares.
2. A solution to the water problem is pressing not only to the
Palestinians but to the Israelis as well: they both face a water
crisis. Indeed, this is a weak point on the Israeli side, and a
lack of solution to the problem constitutes, in itself, a problem
for the Israelis.
3. Any agricultural development within the framework of an
infrastructure for the Palestinian people is contingent on the
extent of control over water sources.
4. No separation, of any form, should exist between negotiation on
water sources and distribution methods.
5. Negotiation over water should be according to the hydrological
distribution of the sources and not according to geographical
areas.
6. The unrestricted determination of present and future water needs
of the Palestinian people, taking into consideration the various
sociological and economic scenarios.
7. The principle of cooperation should be dealt with at a later
stage rather than at the beginning of negotiations. The General
Technical Framework for Negotiating Mechanisms
The figure of a square can form the starting point for a
negotiating mechanism over the issue of water. One side represents
the future needs in water, agriculture, politics, etc. The second
side represents the Palestinian water policy to be adopted. The
third side is the principle of sovereignty over land and water and
the fourth, which closes the square, is the capacity for shared
cooperation with all the other parties on a basis of parity.
From the vantage point of this square, it is easy to visualize the
general mechanism for negotiation for final status, which rests on
defining the strategic objectives for negotiations over this vital
sector; and consequently, the general guidelines, the "technical
guidelines" for this strategy are as follows:
1. To cancel all military orders pertaining to water, as well as
the concessions of the Mekorot company.
2. To provide a clear and focused definition of the concepts of the
agreement. 3. 3. The Jordan River is the political border of the
State of Palestine and it is a shared and international water
source
4. To deal with water sources as one hydrological unit.
5. Not to separate between the issue of water and other issues,
such as the environment and natural resources.
6. To accept the principle of shared cooperation, but within the
framework of an independent water policy for each side, and not to
integrate the region's water policy as though it were
homogeneous.
7. To avoid copying ready-made models for the administration of
water sources from other parts of the world. Indeed, the major flaw
of Article 40 resides in its vagueness and flexibility relating to
the commitments expected on the Israeli side, and its preciseness
where the Palestinians' commitments are concerned.
8. To avoid as much as possible the formation of joint
committees.
In light of the above, the following table presents suggestions for
a proposal for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations over the major
water issues:
Mechanism Degree of
Commitment
a timetable for ending absolute Mekorot concession
the concession
with the specification of absolute Partnership in the Jordan
timetable and quantities River
without timetable absolute The west and north basin
definition of specific relative Joint administration
concepts
In summary, in negotiations, it is incumbent on the Palestinian
side to talk about principles and not to drown in details of
numbers. It should be noted here that we are talking about an
independent state, with sovereignty over its national waters, and
with the capacity for joint cooperation in what will be defined as
international waters.