Daoud Kuttab: A new government has been established in Israel
that must really throw a monkey wrench in your ministry's planning.
As the minister of Planning, how is your ministry, which is looking
at long-term plans, adjusting to the changes in Israel after the
election of Mr. Netanyahu. Nabil Sha'ath: If we start with the really long run, we do
not think, in the Ministry of Planning, that Mr. Netanyahu is going
to change things. In other words, our plans for an independent
Palestinian state side by side with the State of Israel haven't
been changed by the advent of Netanyahu. We want to maintain good
economic relations with Israel, but we strive for an independent
political entity, living in peace, cooperation and coordination
with its neighbors, with people-to-people programs that will really
end years of confrontation and turn them into genuine
reconciliation. Thus, the image and the goal of our endeavor has
not been changed by the advent of Mr. Netanyahu.
Daoud Kuttab: You really think so, after Mr. Netanyahu's call
for doubling settlers in the West Bank? Nabil Sha' ath: I will come to the short run which is, of
course, very serious. I am not in any way marginalizing it. Our
five- to ten-year plans are still based on the premise that this
peace process is good for Israel, is good for the Palestinians, is
good for the Arabs and is good for the world. The majority of
Israelis still support this peace process. So in terms of the
direction in which we are heading, it is still that of
independence, of return of the refugees, of building up a
prosperous country, of peace and neighborliness. That still has not
changed. Nevertheless, we recognize that the Netanyahu government
will in, the short run, put serious obstacles on the road to
that
goal. Therefore, I would rather see the statements of Mr. Netanyahu
and his coalition members as aberrations, as obstacles, as
impediments, rather than as a total redirection of the road back to
confrontation.
Victor Cygielman: When you say the short run, you mean four
years? Nabil Sha'ath: Anything less than five years I consider the
short run.. Daoud Kuttab: Is there anything that your ministry will do that
will affect people in the next four years? Nabil Sha'ath: Of course. We have already done a lot of work
on questions of the closure. In the short run, the closure - which
has been imposed during the last two years - has been absolutely
devastating to many of our plans. In a way, the closure has totally
delayed our plans for major development on the road to economic
independence within interdependence. It has diverted money from
long-term investment programs into short-term emergency projects
and current budget-deficit financing. It has delayed the coming of
money from the donors. It has devastated the present limited
economy, creating very high unemployment and reducing income. The
World Bank's first estimate was by 21 percent this year. But donors
do not want the thing to look as bad as it really is. It is
devastating.
Daoud Kuttab: And you are still optimistic. Why? Nabil Sha'ath: The closure has been the product of a
government of Israel that claimed it wanted peace most. It was
triggered by the security explosions from our side. But, later on,
it became a collective punishment for our people. And as a
collective punishment, it went on while the previous government
continued the process of withdrawal from the West Bank. We saw it
as a very severe and unfair measure, but not one intended to kill
the peace process. Therefore, we dealt with it as a short-term
measure. The new Netanyahu government could be an aberration; but
it certainly could also be a long-term impediment. I am not ruling
out the possibility that, eventually, it can kill the peace process
altogether. That is still a possibility. But I see it as remote in
light of the situation in Israel itself, in the Arab world and in
the world at large.
Daoud Kuttab: If the Netanyahu situation is not an aberration,
there are Palestinians that are already saying that maybe the
concept of a Palestinian state is not the most appropriate one.
Maybe we should now rethink the idea of a binational
state. Nabil Sha'ath: No. I do not think there is any chance today
of a binational state. Remember, I was the father of the idea of a
democratic, non-sectarian, secular Palestinian state for all its
Jews, Christians, and Muslims. I think in the very long run it is
the best idea. It is, after all, the idea that promoted Mr. Mandela
from a prisoner in South Africa to President of South Africa, the
idea that you can make a multiracial, multireligious society
succeed in a unified state, based on two nations or three
religions. But that will not work today.
Daoud Kuttab: We already have apartheid in the West Bank. Jews
have different roads, different electricity grids, different water
quotation prices, different permits.
Nabil Sha'ath: You are talking about apartheid, not a
binational state. A binational state is a state of two nations, and
that is not the case in the West Bank. The case in the West Bank is
an occupied country run by another country that provides
apartheid-like privileges to its own conquerors who have taken part
of the land. This is not a binational state.
Daoud Kuttab: Some say that Palestinian thinking should demand
and request and even approve the idea of a binational
state. Nabil Sha'ath: Demand of whom?
Daoud Kuttab: Of Israel. Change the ideology.
Nabil Sha'ath: The Israelis are neither ready nor willing to
contemplate that idea, Even the most peace-loving part of the
Jewish constituency in Israel is not interested in pursuing this
idea, So, if it is to work, this idea must at least have a hard
core of advocates on the two sides that try to win support from the
rest of the population. Today in Israel, not even the most dovish
parts of the spectrum - Meretz or more dovish people to the left of
Meretz ¬contemplate a democratic binational state. In fact,
the goals adopted by the Labor party favoring a Palestinian state
are based on the idea of separation of the two nations, not on the
idea of integration. By contrast, in terms of closure, Likud might
turn out to really be much better than Labor. The Likud may reduce
the closure for its own reasons, because it does not believe in
separation and fears the closure will create political separation
and the possibility of an independent Palestinian state, So the
peace camp in Israel wants separation and the non-peace camp wants
integration. Where would you be then in asking for a binational
state? With the Likud? You will end up with the integrationists -
i.e., the expansionists - rather than with those who believe in the
rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination.
Victor Cygielman: I have heard, very often, members of the
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and officials ridicule
Israeli leaders' opposition to a Palestinian state. Some told me,
"In fact we already have a state. A few things are missing. We have
a government, a parliament, an authority." What do you think of
this concept?
Nabil Sha'ath: I agree. The idea of an independent Palestinian
state has nothing to do with the Israeli side, or who is running
Israel. An independent Palestinian state is simply delayed now
because of the land issue. We do not want to declare an independent
state in Gaza or in Nablus or in Bethlehem. We want an independent
Palestinian state on all the land occupied in 1967. If you go back
to Oslo, an independent Palestinian state is not on the agenda.
What is negotiable are the borders of the state, not the state.
Therefore, we are a state in the making. We will be an independent
state which will emerge naturally within its agreed borders, with
the completion of Israeli withdrawal.
Before leaving this subject, I also want to layout some of the
serious concerns about the Netanyahu government. I think the basic
problem that we are going to face with Netanyahu is what he is
going to do about settlements and Jerusalem while trying to extend
the duration of negotiations. He will try to create facts on the
ground while procrastinating over the negotiations. I am not in any
way minimizing it, but Netanyahu will not be able to get away with
it. We are going to fight that, and I think Netanyahu will find
that Israel could lose all the privileges in the Arab world, and
with many of the non-traditional trading partners that started
working with Israel as a result of the peace process. He will be
isolated in Europe, and even eventually in the United States. He is
going to face even more problems than Shamir did in the United
States during the days of Bush and Baker.
We are going to have the support of a much broader front of
supporters, and gradually even within Israel. What we expect from
Netanyahu is exactly what his government has declared: first, that
it is going to implement, in letter and spirit, the agreements
signed so far, and second, that it is going to continue
negotiations on permanent settlement. If they implement the
agreements that have been signed and go directly to the
permanent-status negotiations, we will play the game with them. If
they try to procrastinate in these negotiations and create facts on
the ground, we will confront them.
A Likud government signed the first peace with an Arab country,
which included full withdrawal to the last inch and the end of
settlements to the last one. Yamit and Taba are two examples. So it
is possible that the Likud government will turn around and instead
of being an impediment, will sign a historical peace with the
Palestinians. Whatever it is, we are working to build the future
Palestinian state as if it is going to happen in the next five to
ten years.
Daoud Kuttab: What is your scenario on nation-building.
Nabil Sha'ath: Politically, we want to build a nation that has
a strong government, strong enough to maintain peace and security,
but that has the support of a broad base of a democratically
elected parliament and other institutions, such as local
government. Such institutions must survive the problems of the
provisional aspect of the agreement, particularly in terms of
security. When we started building the Palestinian Authority, there
was no question of our acting in an autocratic way, violating human
rights or democratic norms. All the doubts that were created in the
minds of our own people, let alone others, were created as a result
of the security confrontation. Security confrontations always
create problems, both of political consensus and of human and
citizens' rights.
It is very difficult to fight a local militia bent on destroying
your peace process, and therefore your entity, by following the
rules of the book. Even in England, where the book was written
years ago, the anti-terrorist laws violate a lot of the normal
working of the due process of the law. In Italy and Germany, and
currently in the United States, there are serious debates about the
anti-terrorist acts. Whenever a nation is faced with an enemy from
within that is armed and is using its arms to topple the state,
whether it is democratic, like England, France, Germany or the
United States, or not too democratic, such as some of our Arab
neighbors, p;:.rticularly Algeria ¬whenever this proHe:n
presents itsdf, the normal measures of due process are not
sufficient. Therefore, you go beyond the norms of due process until
you restore the status quo ante. Then you try to reduce from the
norms that you had to make to deal with the new threat. Our march
towards democratically based institutions again faces the serious
impediment of our having to deal with our own armed militias
conducting a campaign of violence against the peace process through
killing Israelis.
Daoud Kuttab: But Eyad Elsarraj was not Hamas.
Nabil Sha'ath: Granted. But because it is just Elsarraj it is
really an aberration. Whenever you talk about a country that has
one case -
Victor Cygielman: Excuse me. It was not one case. Several
journalists have been arrested, as well as Elsarraj and others, all
for the same reason, for calumniating or offending the Palestinian
National Authority, which is an argument you hear only in
totalitarian states.
Nabil Sha'ath: I do not want to rationalize. I am not in any
way defending what has been done against Elsarraj or others. I
think it was wrong and had to be corrected, and finally it was
corrected. And not only by the pressure of international public
opinion, but by the pressure of our own democratically elected
institutions.
Victor Cygielman: Was it debated in parliament?
Nabil Sha'ath: It was seriously debated in the Legislative
Council. The problem is not Elsarraj. The problem has been hundreds
of Hamas activists who have been arrested and some of them tortured
to give information about their hide-outs and their arms caches and
their plans to attack the next Israeli target. The assumption is
that it is all right to torture such persons, but some of these
were really innocent. So I am saying Elsarraj is an isolated case.
The basic problem has been the security issue. How do you maintain
the thin line between security and human rights, between security
and citizens' rights? Admittedly, where all the actual perpetrators
are suicides, they leave no trace or proof.
What I really want to say is that facing the problem of terror and
security made the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), for the
first time, make choices that were contrary to what almost all
Palestinians wanted when they started their PNA. You add to that
other types of aberrations, the Elsarraj case
Victor Cygielman: Journalists.
Nabil Sha'ath: You are really talking about two or three cases,
and all of them were briefly detained, created a furor, were
released and you never heard of them again. Elsarraj was called in
more than once. I think the problem was very much what he was
telling the world, which in my mind is no justification for his
arrest. I do not want to defend that at all.
So the plan was to build democratic institutions, and we did. We
are the fastest country in the world to have democratic elections
for president and council before it has declared itself to be an
independent state. And if you have any doubt about the freedom of
our PLC, go attend it. It is free. You can attend any of the
sessions. It is really very tough on the president and the
PNA.
Daoud Kuttab: What about the economic sphere?
Nabil Sha'ath: The institutions of a democratic state with a
multiparty system - central government, local governments, NGO's -
have created, in effect, fertile ground for the kind of economic
policy we aim at. We have very little land and very little water,
and almost no mineral resources. But we have people, technically
skilled people, steeped in entrepreneurship, who have creatively
developed business enterprises all around the world. These have
learned the skills of entrepreneurship and business operation,
having developed credit-worthiness, capital, savings, technology
and contacts. This is very rare.
So we plan on the basis of a free-enterprise economy, with the
least regulatory powers and regulations, based on markets
movements, coupled with the entrepreneurial and technical skills of
the Palestinians. We should be able to choose those economic
endeavors in which we have a sustained advantage, and therefore
should be able to create export-driven enterprises without the
problems that have limited other Third-World countries, First, the
government must overcome the very serious infrastructural lags
caused by long-term occupation and closures. Whenever an
infrastructure can be privatized we are starting it privately run,
such as telecommunications and power generation. Whenever it can be
regionalized - such as linking with the regional electricity grid,
the regional road network, the regional natural gas pipelines, the
regional tourist development plans - we will regionalize.
Daoud Kuttab: Which of the sectors of economics is your
priority?
Nabil Sha'ath: We have a big agricultural sector, but this has
to be improved and turned around to also produce export-driven
agriculture. And that is why some of our most important physical
plans have been a harbor and an airport. In industry, we have to
start with what we do have: the textile and shoe industries, but we
have to move into high-tech industries, which are best suited to
the Palestinian composition of high-level manpower, as well as to
an environmentally sane and export-driven industry. This could be
the most successful co-venture with Israel. The road to regional
cooperation with Israel lies very much in our development of
high-tech industry. In tourism, which has been stalled by the
closure, we must develop a regional approach to both holy and
non-holy tourism, whereby we share seriously in tourist income. We
will have a lot of Palestinian and Arab tourists who will want to
corne spend the whole summer in Palestine. Finally, other types of
services. We really have to see Palestine in a similar light as
maybe Israel and Lebanon, and that is developing very important and
advanced hospitals, research inst!tutions, universities, R&D
organizations, banks, insurance companies and financial
markets.
Now in trade, tourism, high-tech and infrastructure we will be as
regional as possible. In agriculture and some of the services we
will have to be independent. The essence is to create a
sufficiently independent decision¬making capability and a
sufficiently independent economy, so when we speak of
interdependence, we do not fall under the hegemony of Israel or any
other local partner.
Daoud Kuttab: Despite your rosy picture, there have been some
setbacks.
Nabil Sha' ath: The basic setback is really the closure, let's
face it. Who wants to put $600 million in telecommunications in a
country where you are not sure how to get in; or worse, how to get
out?
Victor Cygielman: If I understood well, your approach to the
economy is one of private enterprise. In this respect you are very
close to Mr. Netanyahu who also wants to privatize.
Nabil Sha'ath: I am close to what is happening in the world. He
is close too.
Victor Cygielman: Of course. My question is based on Israel's
experience. Israel would not have been able to build up any
infrastructure that exists today if there had not been, in the
beginning, more social and centralized planning in the hands of the
state and other national institutions, to facilitate planned
agricultural cooperation and industrial development. You had a case
very similar to Palestine, where private investors were not willing
to come to a small country, where they could earn very little, and
everything went through donations and through the state for this
build-up of the infrastructure. Aren't you afraid that by going
straight to privatization without having any national central
planning, you may face very great difficulties?
Nabil Sha'ath: If you look at the plans made by the
Palestinians prior to Oslo, they were Israeli in that sense.
Professor Yusuf Said estimated that in the first five years we
would be getting $17 billion from public aid and much more from
private investments: Gulf money pouring in, money from Japan and
Germany, similar to what happened to Israel at its inception.
Israel received German reparations, which created the basic
infrastructure of Israel. If all these resources are available, it
is certainly an enticement for the government to do everything. We
do not have these resources. We have a promise of $2.4 billion in
aid that is creeping so slowly that in the last six months we were
only able to get $100 million, and all that went to cure the
problems of closure rather than to build anything for the future.
We are in a different situation.
You were adopted by a major ally who was willing to protect you and
give you support, and you had a very organized world Jewry which
was willing to pour money into the state. You lived for a very long
time in a world which accepted central planning as a major method
and public ownership through public enterprise. We have a totally
different situation. Whatever money we can get today from donors
has to go to the infrastructure. But it is not enough, and that is
why we have to look for private enterprise in the region to help us
build the infrastructure. The total collected taxes by the
Palestinians - which is, by the way, quite high in comparison to
the world - does not cover even our current needs now.
So we cannot move on the Israeli model. The state will have to get
funds to build the infrastructure that cannot be privatized, and
that is a lot ¬roads, schools, hospitals, sewage systems,
water carrier systems - and has to provide a lot of money to
support Palestinians who were traumatized during the
pre-independence days and during the Intifada, and so on. We have a
duty to people who lost everything during the Intifada. In a
different world it was different. As a result of our peace process
and the Gulf War that preceded it, Palestine today has not yet
gotten enough aid to compensate for the lost revenue from the
transfer of Palestinians in the Gulf and from the support of the
Arab countries to the PLO. The PLO, in certain years, spent $400
million to $500 million a year inside the occupied territories.
Kuwaiti Palestinians alone sent horne $280 million a year, up to
the year 1990.
You have to remember we are starting in very difficult times, The
Palestinian Diaspora is very disorganized. It is not like the
Jewish Diaspora at the creation of Israel. It is a much poorer
Diaspora. Instead of Israel starting with the Law of Return and
allowing any Jew in the world to identify with Israel, we are
starting with a law in which Israel prevents any Palestinian from
corning back horne to settle. So our Diaspora has a lot of
anxieties and very serious concerns about our experiment, whereas
the Jewish Diaspora, at the start of the State of Israel, saw
itself in total unity with this new experiment.