The Intifada in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in December, 1987,
signalled the beginning of a new and stormy chapter in
Palestinian-Israeli relations. The relative calm which prevailed
after the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was disrupted; tensions were
exacerbated and both sides incurred enormous material and human
losses. During the first three years of the Intifada in particular,
Israeli and Palestinian societies were at loggerheads. Not only did
neither side feel secure, but their huma¬nity lost more and
more of its worth.
The credibi¬lity gap between Palestinians and Israelis grew
wider, and the likelihood of resolving the conflict seemed nil. In
this respect, the Intifada at first played a perpetuatory role: it
contributed to the deepening of the classical modes of hostility
between the two rivals.
The "power" of the Intifada, however, was at the same time working
in a diametrically opposite direction. The two sides which battled
each other on the streets of the occupied territories greeted and
addressed each other at the negotiating table in Madrid, Spain in
late 1991. Distrust and diminution of security, which characterized
Palestinian-Israeli relations during the Intifada, compelled the
two protagonists to realize that the only way out of the prevalent
no-win situation was in creating a mutually beneficial environment.
At the instigation of the United States, the vehicle was defined as
the negotiating table and the objective was declared by the parties
immediately concerned as the break away from instability and
hostility. The heralding of stones and bullets, while deepening
hatred and insecurity, led to the climax of the conflict, and hence
to beginning its resolution.
In this respect, it can be said that the Intifada played a
trans¬formative role: It brought home to both parties the
impact of the ills of hostility and uncontrolled rivalry. In the
process, a new atmosphere was created and a set of new
characteristics started to shape Palestinian-Israeli relations:
bridges of contact were built and business-like talks were
instituted. Participation by the Palestinian delegation in the
peace talks along with its Israeli counterpart, and engagement by
the PLO in coordinating arrangements with Israeli officials, made
the formulation of the Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of
Principles on August 19, 1993 and the forma¬lization of the
Israeli-PLO recognition agreement in Washington, DC, on September
13, 1993, an inevitable result.
In what follows, the objective is to analyze some of the dynamics
which led Palestinians and Israelis to pursue the current peace
process, particularly, its prime components, the Declaration of
Principles and mutual recognition agreements. Furthermore, an
analysis of the impact of the current process on both parties will
be attempted.
Despite the fact that the Israeli authorities decided to meet the
Palestinian Intifada with determined resistance, to crush it, a
strong sense of dissatisfaction vis¬a-vis the seeming
intractability of the conflict permeated various ranks in Israeli
public opinion. Shamir's decision to participate in the Madrid
talks was a conversion of broad domestic political sentiments into
a foreign policy agenda as much as it perhaps was an attempt on his
part to entrap Palestinians into circular diplomatic maneuvers.
Israeli public opinion was dismayed by the negative perceptual
con¬sequences resulting from the frequent scenes of Israeli
soldiers battling unarmed Palestinian children, displayed by the
world media. Participating in the talks as well as in its evolving
results has concretized a more positive image of the Israeli in the
eyes of world public opinion. The dissatisfaction of Israeli public
opinion with its leadership's inattentiveness to the realization of
peace under the Shamir government was further punctuated by
bringing the Labor Party to office in 1992. Although the Labor
ministers did not perform any more accommodatingly than the
hard-liners towards the Palestinian Intifada before they assumed
office, the sheer fact of entrusting them with the government
signaled to them the urgent need for a change. No sooner had Labor
won the elections in 1992, than they started holding secret talks
with the PLO.
Yet it remains to be said that the new Israeli government of
Yitzhak Rabin had to balance the determinants of its domestic
policy with other economic and foreign policy considerations. The
influx of Soviet Jews required more than the rhetoric of
hospitality: the demographic and infrastructure changes they
created dictated the designing of a strategy that would put the
scientific and hi-tech skills they brought with them into practice.
The key to the realization of this long-term objective, the new
Israeli leadership understood, did not lie in further enhancing
military preponderance in the region, but rather, in erecting
bridges of economic cooperation with Arab neighbors. No desire for
cooperation could have been credible without looking afresh at the
Palestinian side of the equation. Hence Israeli and Palestinian
leaders conferred and it was they who instituted cooperation and
mutual recognition as the defining terms of the present political
process. Indeed the spirit of cooperation is inculcated in most of
the provisions of the Declaration of Principles document. The focus
on coordination signifies not only an attempt to work out
arrangements during a transitional phase, but also a recognition of
the centrality of mutuality if stability is to ensue. Motivated by
domestic policy considerations, the Israeli leadership formulated a
foreign policy agenda toward the Palestinians and the Arab world on
the basis of interdependence and shared benefits.
Undoubtedly, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the consequent
reduction of fears associated with it, the diminution of the
vitality of territoriality in the Middle East as a function of the
Gulf War, and perhaps the noticeable waning of the United States'
economic standing in the world, motivated Israeli leaders to infuse
their national security with economic cooperative
conside¬rations. The geographically-close Arab World was too
distant politically and psychologically for the Israelis. The
region's rich resources, combined with the richness of Israeli
know-how can turn hatred into joint planning for a better future.
This is in part why Israelis and Palestinians preambled their
Declaration of Principles with an emphasis on the need to move away
from hostility to stability and mutuality of benefits. The
Palestinians, for their part, convinced that the symbolic
achievements gained by the Intifada could not bring about the
hoped-for transformation in their situation, viewed participating
in the talks as a logical measure they had to pursue. Operating in
the midst of a fragmented Arab World, Palestinian interest in
stability, which previously diverged from its Israeli counterpart,
now converged with it. The deep sense of despair which overwhelmed
both sides to the conflict created among Palestinians a strong
impetus towards reconciliation. In official Palestinian circles the
prevalent perception has been that no longer could there be a
determination of Palestinian destiny without concerted coordination
with their hitherto rival. Recognition of Palestinian rights by the
Israelis, Palestinian leaders calculated, is part and parcel of a
process in which consequences have to be mutually beneficial. Such
a framework deepened the feelings among Palestinian leaders that
Palestinian political rights and Israeli security requirements are
complementary rather than divisive compulsions. Neither party could
achieve its objectives with ease, as this trend of thinking
evolved, without quid pro quo arrangements. The realization among
Palestinians grew that exactly as it took two parties to engage in
confrontation, it would also take two to pursue cooperation. Hence
Palestinian incorporation of their desire for cooperation with the
Israelis in most areas of development, as shown in the
declaration.
In conclusion, the Declaration of Principles and mutual recognition
agreements represent a milestone break away from the past. Instead
of the traditional Palestinian and Israeli unilateral assertions of
the need and/ or the desire to destroy each other, the new
relationship stresses the need to rebuild one another. What remains
to be seen however is the extent to which both parties will be able
to concretize what the agreement contains.