Almost from the beginning of modern Zionism, relations between Jews
and Arabs in the Holy Land have been marked by bloodshed on both
sides. As of early 2003, the total number of Jews killed is around
20,000; Arab, including Palestinian Arab, casualties have been even
higher. This paper will provide a brief outline of the armed
conflict between the two peoples, and will suggest a path that
might lead to a resolution.
One of the best-known early harbingers of modern Zionism was Rabbi
Tsvi Kalisher. In 1862, having returned from a visit to the Holy
Land, he published a book entitled Greetings from Zion. The book
contained what its author claimed was a divinely inspired blueprint
for the resettlement of the country by Jews. To realize the plan it
would be necessary to have "battle worthy guards" to prevent the
"tent dwelling sons of Ishmael" from "destroying the seed and
uprooting the vineyard."
Socio-Economic Factors
As this formulation makes clear, violence was originally rooted in
social and economic problems. It was directed not by Arabs against
Jews - or vice versa - but by nomads and other desperately poor
people against those who were settled and at least a little better
off. Take the residents of Abu Gosh: since their village straddled
the road to Jerusalem, they robbed travelers regardless of whether
they were Arabs or Jews. Only after the end of World War I did the
violence assume a pronounced national character, and even then
socio-economic factors continued to play a prominent part.
The Zionists felt that their attempts to settle the country were
constantly harassed by Arabs (nobody spoke of Palestinians, a term
that only came into vogue after 1967) out to rob, destroy, kill
and, occasionally, rape. The Arabs believed they were merely trying
to hold on to land that was being taken away from them by
foreigners who had purchased it and never hesitated to apply fraud
or force to add to it.
The first country-wide outbreak of violence took place in 1929.
Both sides accused each other of initiating it, and both committed
atrocities. The Arab inhabitants of Hebron wiped out the entire
Jewish community there and completely destroyed several other
Jewish settlements. Jews in Haifa commandeered a bus, drove it into
a crowded market and fired in all directions, a harbinger of many
similar incidents during the next two decades. The difference was
that the Jewish community had started developing a nationwide,
para-military organization known as the Hagana (Defense). Over the
coming two decades, that organization was to prove decisive in the
struggle between the two peoples.
British, Jews and Palestinians
In 1936-1939, as in 1929, Arab Palestinian violence was directed as
much against the British rulers as against the Jewish community.
This gave the Jews another decisive advantage; whereas they were
often able to operate in the shadow of the Imperial Power, the
Palestinians were very much on their own. The activists among them
were hunted down by the British and Jews alike; and Palestinian
casualties exceeded Jewish ones many times over. During World War
II, 30,000 members of the Jewish community even joined the British
Armed Forces, enabling them to obtain training and experience. By
contrast, Palestinian Arab military training was limited to a few
thousand who had served with the British police.
Another very great advantage the Jews enjoyed over the Palestinians
was their links with Jewish communities abroad. After 1945, this
enabled the Hagana to purchase arms, including heavy ones. It also
began developing a technological infrastructure capable of
maintaining, repairing and producing arms. By contrast, the
Palestinians were still mainly organized in local bands, whether
urban based, as in Jaffa and Haifa, or rural. They had practically
no logistic infrastructure and were limited almost entirely to
light weapons. Once the British left the country, it quickly became
clear that they were no match for the Hagana and its successor, the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF). By the summer of 1948, about 700,000
Palestinians had left the country.
Five Arab States Invade
While the Jewish war against the Palestinian Arab appeared to have
been decided, the war against the Arab States had only just begun.
To support the Palestinians, in the hope of gaining land and of
preventing others from making such gains, five Arab states invaded
the newly proclaimed State of Israel on May 16, 1948. At the height
of the war, Trans-Jordanian Forces reached within 15 kilometers of
Tel Aviv, while Iraqi forces almost succeeded to cut Israel in
half. Egyptian forces were 40 kilometers from Tel Aviv and fighting
over Ramat Rachel, just a few kilometers south of Jerusalem.
By dint of an all-out effort and heavy casualties - one percent of
the entire population fell in the field - the Jewish State
survived. Having done so, it found itself still surrounded by
enemies who refused to accept the new status quo and loudly
proclaimed their determination to destroy it at the earliest
opportunity. Many of the Palestinians who had been turned into
refugees in 1948 tried to return to their homes. Others, whether on
their own initiative or that of the Arab armies, carried out
sabotage missions inside Israel, leading to countless skirmishes
that occasionally threatened to develop into full-scale war. In
1956 and 1967, the Jewish State, convinced that its existence was
in danger, mobilized and lashed out at its enemies. Both wars
resulted in smashing victories for Israel, and the second one also
led to the occupation of large pieces of territory.
1973 Proved Decisive
It was the fourth (or, if one counts the "War of Attrition of
1969-70 separately, the fifth) Arab Israeli War of October 1973
that proved decisive. The Israeli forces, having suffered initial
setbacks, still retained the upper hand, even though their
advantage was no longer as decisive as previously. Politically, the
war seems to have convinced most of the Arab states that their
original goal, namely, destroying Israel as a state, was out of
reach. First Egypt, then Jordan drew conclusions from this, ending
the conflict and signing formal peace treaties with their neighbor.
Syria could have had a similar arrangement long ago; however a
dispute over a few hundred acres its army had captured from Israel
in 1948, that Israel refused to give up, prevented such an
outcome.
The Palestinians Emerge
While the conflict between Israel and its neighbors was winding
down, the Palestinian problem continued to fester. As noted, before
the establishment of Israel, Jews and Palestinians had often
clashed in places where they lived near each other. After its
establishment, Palestinians acted as triggers in the countless
skirmishes that took place along Israel's borders. However, their
military role was rather minor. Both sides, the Israelis and the
Arab countries, tended to look down on them. They were considered
impotent, fit only to serve as second-rate cannon fodder. The 1948
War left over 100,000 Palestinians under Israeli rule, and its 1967
successor increased that number many times over. Resistance to the
occupation started almost immediately. For twenty years, it
consisted almost exclusively of pinpricks. Indeed the long time it
took the Palestinian people before they finally broke into
full-scale revolt is one of the great mysteries of the Arab-Israeli
Conflict
While the Palestinians inside the territories were almost impotent,
their brethren in Lebanon were not. Supported by Syria throughout
the 1970s, they escalated their attacks against northern Israel
where they grew into an important, though hardly existential,
threat. Israel's massive invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was meant to
put an end to the attacks, as well as to detach Lebanon from Syria
and force it to make peace with Israel; an objective that failed
completely. The Palestinian forces in Lebanon were indeed smashed
beyond repair. However, in their place soon appeared other
guerrilla organizations that took over the struggle. Hizbollah
proved particularly effective. After eighteen years of more or less
continuous warfare, it drove the mighty Israeli army out of
Lebanon.
The First Intifada
In 1987, the first Intifada, its advent perhaps hastened by the
evident difficulties the Israeli army was having in Lebanon, broke
out. It proved that the Palestinians had ceased being cannon fodder
and were fighting with tremendous courage and determination against
overwhelming odds rarely met by other peoples in similar
situations. It became clear that although they stood no chance of
defeating the Israeli army, that army was equally incapable of
defeating them. Yitzhak Rabin, who at that time was acting as
minister of defense in Yitzhak Shamir's government, took a long
time to understand these facts. For three years he talked of
putting down the uprising and did what he could to achieve that
noble aim. Only after he lost his post did he start rethinking the
issue; and his election as prime minister in the summer of 1992
enabled him to put his thoughts into effect.
The Oslo Accords
The signing, in September 1993, of the Oslo Peace Accord was one of
the best agreements in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. I
happened to be in a New York hotel when the news came. It was if as
the sun had broken through the clouds. I was happy beyond words;
with millions of other Israelis, I thought that perhaps my children
might be spared the need to fight as my generation had. If that
meant that the Palestinians were finally going to obtain their own
state, so much the better. Along with many on the Israeli Left, I
thought it was the decent thing to do.
I still think the Oslo Agreements had a fair chance of leading to a
permanent peace. Who is to blame for the failure of the Agreements,
and hence the outbreak of the second Intifada, is not at issue
here. Probably people on both sides bear a considerable part of the
responsibility; as, indeed, has been the case throughout the
conflict when each side often claimed it was retaliating for past
acts of war committed by the other. Even if the truth of the matter
could be established in an "objective" manner, trading accusations
will not bring us any closer to a solution. The question is - what
may be learnt from the tragic story, and what may be done to bring
it to an end?
Good Fences Make Good Neighbors
Looking back over the history of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, one
fact seems to stand out. From the beginning of the Zionist revival,
indeed, even before it started, wherever Jews and Arabs were
intermixed, difficulties arose. Wherever they were separated, life
became, if not exactly idyllic, at least tolerable. It was the
existence of a clear border line that, after decades of armed
struggle and several major wars, permitted peace between Israelis
and Egyptians and between Israelis and Jordanians to take hold.
Even the fence that separates Israel from Lebanon seems to be
holding up. The visible proof of this is the housing projects that
are rising on both its sides. As the saying goes, fences do good
neighbors make.
Fences, or walls, have also proved their worth at other times and
places. The Great Wall of China kept out the barbarians for
centuries, as did the Roman frontier or limes. The Berlin Wall
worked magnificently, turning a city that almost sparked off World
War III into one of the most peaceful places on earth, one that
West Berliners still look back on with a certain nostalgia. In
Cyprus, the wall that separates Turks from Greeks has functioned
equally well during the last thirty years. Surely there are few
peoples who have hated each other so much, and for so long, as
Greeks and Turks.
A Wall - By Agreement or Unilaterally
A wall, meaning a more or less complete Israeli withdrawal and the
establishment of a Palestinian State, may not be the preferred
solution of either side. It will compel Israelis to give up
territories, including important parts of Jerusalem, that many of
them regard as their God-given birthright. It will compel
Palestinians to give up the right of return, something Israel
cannot and will not concede. It will greatly impede the ability of
both peoples to move and trade. On the other hand, it will also
permit each of them to live freely, without having to come into
daily contact with the other and without the constant friction that
such contact generates.
If an Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian
State can be brought about by agreement, so much the better. If, as
seems more likely at the moment, this cannot be achieved, Israel
should do what has to be done unilaterally, to end a struggle that
is proving unbearable. Militarily speaking, getting out will not
involve intolerable cost. The history of the conflict until 1967
amply confirms that Israel can be defended from within its original
borders. With some help from modern technology, such as sea-based
precision-guided weapons and balloons to provide early warning
against attack, this should be even more true today. If Iraqi
military power is neutralized by the Americans, so much the
better.
Finally, the wall need not necessarily be permanent. As also
happened in other places, it is possible that, after several
decades in which the last widows will have remarried or resigned
themselves to their fate, and the last orphans on both sides have
grown up and founded families, real peace will come. The wall may
be torn down and normal relations established. Until that day
arrives, almost anything is better than the continuation of the
present situation in which men, women and children on both sides
are killed every day. As President Bush once said, the future
itself is being murdered. We know the past, and it is a sad tale.
While there is no way to erase it, there is no reason why we have
to live with it.