The idea that the world confronts a "new" terrorism completely
unlike the terrorism of the past has taken hold in the minds of
policy makers, pundits, consultants, and academics, especially in
the US. However, terrorism remains an intrinsically political
rather than cultural phenomenon and, as such, the terrorism of
today is not fundamentally or qualitatively "new", but grounded in
an evolving historical context.1 The idea of a "new" terrorism is
often based on insufficient knowledge of history, as well as
misinterpretations of contemporary terrorism. Such thinking is
often contradictory. For example, it is not clear when the "new"
terrorism began or the old ended, or which groups belong in which
category.
Shifting the Goals
First, the ends of the "new" terrorism are presumed to be unlimited
and non-negotiable. Such terrorists are said to have no "red
lines." In this view, their goals are derived exclusively from
religious doctrines that emphasize transformational and apocalyptic
beliefs, usually associated with Islam, although present in all
monotheistic religions. The "new" terrorists are presumed to hate
Western, and especially American, values, culture, civilization and
existence. Their violence is expressive, not strategic or
instrumental. Destruction is an end in itself, rather than the
means to an end.
The goals of the "old" terrorism, by contrast, are thought to have
been negotiable and limited. The past aims of terrorism were
understandable and tangible, typically related to issues of
territorial autonomy. Deals could be struck. The state could
bargain with them. Conflicts could be resolved. In effect, these
were sensible terrorists.
Ambitious and even unobtainable ends, however, are not unique to
religion or to the contemporary political environment. Believing in
the impossible is not unusual for radical movements. The European
anarchists of the late 19th century sought to overthrow all
government. They assassinated eight different heads of state in
order to bring down the political order. Sendero Luminoso wished to
establish a Maoist regime in Peru, and its demands were
non-negotiable. In the 1970s, revolutionary organizations in
Germany and Italy, with little to no popular support, thought they
could destroy well-established liberal democracies. Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna (ETA) seeks to establish a Basque state that would
include parts of both France and Spain.
Furthermore, groups claiming to act in the name of religious
doctrine are often more apocalyptic in their rhetoric than in their
behavior. They have often shown themselves to be astute political
strategists, using terrorism successfully to drive out foreign
military forces or disrupt peace processes. Hezbollah and Hamas are
excellent examples, and al Qaeda's activities can also be
interpreted in pragmatic terms. Acting in the name of religion does
not mean acting without reason.
Moreover, all "religious" terrorists are not alike. Also, just as
ETA and even the Irish Republican Army (IRA) took on a socialist
veneer when it was ideologically fashionable, so too nationalistic
or other groups may take on an Islamic cast because radical Islamic
beliefs have popular appeal and can generate international support.
Ideology and religion are useful recruiting devices. While some
members of radical organizations are motivated by sincere beliefs,
others are less committed to group values. Individual militants may
be manipulated by their leaders.
Increasing Destruction
Second, the means of the "new" terrorism are assumed to be
different. The premise is that because the ends of the new
terrorism are unlimited, so, too, are the means. The "new"
terrorists are supposed to be eager to cause the largest possible
number of casualties among their enemies and also to be willing to
sacrifice any number of their own in the process. The "new"
terrorism is often associated with the advent of "suicide"
terrorism. These terrorists are also thought to be more inclined
than secular groups to use "weapons of mass destruction."
Apocalyptic motivations are said to lead to unprecedented
lethality. Presumably for the "new" terrorists the means have
become an end in themselves, not a way of reaching an audience
other than the deity. The "new" terrorists seek only to destroy,
and their deaths will result only in a place in paradise, not
political change.
The "old" terrorism is considered to be much more restrained and
specific in targeting. The traditional terrorist wanted people
watching, not people dead, according to Brian Jenkins' now famous
aphorism. These terrorists imposed restraints on their actions
because they aimed to change the attitudes of popular audiences who
could help them achieve their goals. Although capable of being more
destructive, they chose not to be.
However, the "old" terrorists were not necessarily discriminating
in their choice of targets. The French anarchists of the 1880s
bombed restaurants frequented by the bourgeoisie in order to show
the working class who the true enemy was. Had they possessed more
powerful bombs, they would undoubtedly have killed more people. The
concept of "propaganda of the deed," which is still at the heart of
terrorism, was invented by Peter Kropotkin. During the Algerian
war, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) attacked
Europeans indiscriminately, leaving bombs in cafes, on beaches, in
soccer stadiums and at bus stops in Algiers during the famous
"Battle of Algiers." Their bombs often killed Algerians as well as
Europeans. (At the time, some French writers assigned such
ruthlessness to a specifically Arab mentality, an early resort to a
cultural explanation of terrorism.) The FLN also considered bombing
the Eiffel Tower, in a campaign to bring the war home to France. In
the late 1960s, secular groups (including the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine) conceived of hijacking civilian airliners
and kidnapping and assassinating diplomats, both serious breaches
of international norms. (The existence of normative prohibitions,
of course, makes the target more rather than less attractive to
terrorists.) A Sikh extremist group bombed an Indian airliner in
midair in 1986, and the secular regime of Colonel Qaddafi bombed
Pan Am flight 103 in 1988. A main practitioner of "suicide"
terrorism has been the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in
Sri Lanka. Far-right extremists were also prone to causing large
numbers of casualties; for instance, 85 people were killed in the
bombing of the Bologna railroad station in 1980. In sum, one could
argue that the "old" terrorism was limited more by lack of
capabilities than by self-imposed and principled restraint.
Moreover, the highly destructive, or potentially highly
destructive, attacks seen in the past decade may be the exception
rather than the rule. They may not be typical. Among examples of
the "new" terrorism, Aum Shinrikyo's attack on the Tokyo subway is
the only example of use of chemical weapons2. The September 11
hijackings caused the highest number of casualties of any single
terrorist attack in history, but other al Qaeda terrorism has
fallen within a more normal range3.
Re-Grouping
The organization of the new terrorism is also thought to be
fundamentally different from earlier organizational structures of
terrorism. The "new" terrorists are said to be decentralized, with
a "flat" networked apparatus rather than a hierarchical or cellular
structure. Sub-units are supposed to have substantial autonomy, and
the organization is genuinely transnational. By contrast, the "old"
terrorist structure was known to be centralized and top-down.
Individual leaders mattered less.
There is much to be said for the organizational distinctiveness of
al Qaeda, but there are problems with the assumption that it is
entirely different from the past or that it is necessarily a model
for the future. First, al Qaeda is the only example of such a
network or franchise/venture capital operation. Other "religious"
terrorist groups are more traditional (Hezbollah, Hamas, or
Egyptian Islamic Jihad). Second, even the intelligence agencies do
not completely understand how al Qaeda is organized. There may be
more centralization than appears to the public eye. Certainly,
extensive face-to-face communication occurred within the group, at
least prior to September 11. It is also important to remember the
importance of the shared experience and socialization in
Afghanistan, a factor in the organizational development of al Qaeda
that is unlikely to be present in the emergence of other "new"
terrorists.
Furthermore, the organization of the "old" terrorism was not always
centralized. In fact, most groups experienced serious
fragmentation. Peter Merkl, for example, has argued that the
apparently monolithic quality of the Red Army Faction in West
Germany was a myth4. The 19th century anarchists formed a
transnational conspiracy, linking activists in Russia, Germany,
Switzerland, France, Spain, Italy, and the US. The essence of
anarchism was antipathy to central direction, and much terrorism
was locally generated. In addition, some of the more hierarchical
groups actually allowed significant local autonomy. The Active
Service Units of the IRA, for example, sometimes acted
autonomously, without the approval of the Army Council. The Italian
Red Brigades were organized in independent "columns" in different
cities. The French Action Directe was actually two groups, one
limited to France and the other operating internationally. The
latter was linked to groups in Belgium.
Thus the distinction between the "new" and the "old" terrorism is
not as fundamental as proponents of the "new" terrorism view would
have it. Differences among groups and over time do exist, but they
may be attributable to a changing environment (processes associated
with what is termed globalization, in particular), specific
opportunity structures, and evolutionary progression, even
learning. Observations about a "new" terrorism often lack a basis
in sustained and systematic empirical research, and they tend to
neglect history. Perhaps the question that should be asked is, why
are analysts so attracted to the idea of a qualitatively different
"new" terrorism rather than the idea of continuity and gradual
change?
1 See Stathis N. Kalyvas, "'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars: A
Valid Distinction?" World Politics 54 (October 2001), 99-118. The
idea of a "new" terrorism is most often associated with the
assumption that "religious" terrorism is a distinct and novel
phenomenon. The idea gained credence not only with the growth of
radical Islam post Iranian revolution but after the 1995 Aum
Shinrikyo sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway. Examples of the
literature include Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism
and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999), and Ian O. Lesser, et al., Countering the New
Terrorism (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1999). On the
subject of religious terrorism, see Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in
the Mind of God (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2000).
2 Another possible example is the LTTE's use of chlorine gas in an
attack on a Sri Lankan army base, but their use appears to have
been circumstantial and opportunistic, not planned. See in general
Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of
Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). Also
Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer,
America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).
3 This is not to imply that we should ever regard terrorism as
"normal." Also, some observers would count the actions of states as
terrorism, and would point to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I am focusing
on nonstates and on the conspiratorial covert behavior of states in
peacetime, rather than acts of war.
4 See Peter Merkl, "West German Left-Wing Terrorism," in Terrorism
in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1995.)
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