Marwan Barghouthi is a member of the Revolutionary Council of
Fateh. He is currently serving a life sentence in an Israeli jail,
but is viewed by all observers, including Israelis, as a potential
future Palestinian leader. His imprisonment is seen as a political
act and his release will constitute a substantial part of any
future political breakthrough.
This interview originally appeared in the Lebanese paper
al-Shira'. This is the first publication of the interview in
English.
Question: How do you envisage the future working relationship
between President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) who is affiliated with
Fateh Movement and a Hamas-led government in the light of Israel's
unilateral policy and the international boycott of the Hamas
government?
I consider that the building of democratic Palestinian institutions
consolidates the Palestinian struggle and leads to the
solidification of the partnership between the various powers. The
presidential, local, and legislative elections are an achievement
that is a source of pride for the Palestinians and a badge of honor
for Fateh adherents because it is their movement that has pioneered
and founded this democratic structure. Now the national partnership
is being embodied in the Palestinian Authority (PA) through the
president and the government - i.e., between the movements of Fateh
and Hamas - and it encompasses all members of the Palestinian
Legislative Council (PLC).
In my estimation, the possibility of returning to the negotiating
table and the so-called peace process has dwindled considerably, if
not completely. This has been the case, especially since Camp David
and Ehud Barak's declaration that "there is no Palestinian
partner." Ariel Sharon adopted this statement and made it his
mantra, and embarked on the liquidation of the PA, including its
president Yasser Arafat.
There seems to exist a general consensus in Israel regarding the
strategy of unilateral solutions that ignore the Palestinians
altogether. Israel's recourse to such a strategy stems from its
reluctance to accept a solution that will give the Palestinians the
minimum level of their inalienable national rights. Unilateral
steps will not lead to stability, security, or peace. Peace can
only be attained by an end to the occupation and a complete Israeli
withdrawal from the Palestinian areas occupied in 1967; the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem
as its capital; and the guarantee and implementation of the right
of return of the Palestine refugees.
Will Hamas be able to reconcile between the logic of the
continuation of armed resistance with the logic of the PA and the
political process?
This question should be addressed to Hamas. Nonetheless, Hamas
enjoys a majority in the PLC and has formed a government on its
own; it has the right to choose its policy and to represent it as
it sees fit. That said, Hamas bears the responsibility to preserve
the national gains achieved by the Palestinian people locally,
regionally and internationally. It should also be stressed that the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) remains the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people and the highest political
reference. The fact that the PLO now finds itself beleaguered with
stagnation and erosion, and needs radical and comprehensive reform,
does not invalidate this legitimacy. I hope that both Hamas and
Islamic Jihad will join the organization, for they have an
important role to play in the Palestinian arena. I am hoping
mechanisms can be found for a prompt rebuilding and restructuring
of the PLO institutions, and I am looking forward to the convening
of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) with its new frameworks,
in order to preserve the national unity within the organization. I
believe that according to the interim constitution, the PA powers
are distributed between the elected president and the elected
government, and Hamas has to take these facts very seriously into
consideration. It is deplorable that a power struggle appears on
television at a time when the real powers in Palestine are falling
into the hands of the occupation, and while the Palestinian people
together with the PA, the president and the PLC are all still under
occupation.
The fact is that Fateh was able to reconcile between the political,
the diplomatic, the negotiations, and the control of the PA, on the
one hand, and resistance and the intifada, on the other, bolstered
by international legitimacy as well as laws and resolutions
pertaining to Palestine. Will Hamas be capable of doing the same?
The immediate future will tell. In my view, Hamas must hold on to
the resistance option and reject free concessions, although it is
going to find great difficulty combining between the PA and
resistance.
What does Hamas's new position signal when it talks, for the
first time, about the possibility of coexistence with Israelis
within two states on the bases of a long-term truce?
There is a consensus among all the Palestinian forces and factions
that the goal of the Palestinian people at this historical juncture
is the establishment of an independent, fully sovereign state
within the borders of 1967, with its capital Jerusalem, and the
exercise of the right of return for all the Palestine refugees.
This is what was agreed upon in the Cairo Declaration, which is an
indirect acceptance of the principle of the two-state
solution.
In a message to the UN, the new PA Foreign Minister, Mahmoud
al-Zahhar, reportedly talked about a two-state solution, and the
leaders of Hamas have reacted positively to the principles of peace
as put forward by the Arab countries. I think Hamas and its
government are looking for reciprocation and a price for their
agreement to any political move. They are right to insist on a
genuine reciprocation; it is neither acceptable nor logical to give
free concessions.
How do you envisage getting out of prison in the light of rumors
that you may be included in a prisoners exchange between Israel and
Hizbullah?
First of all, let me stress that my major preoccupation remains the
freedom of the Palestinian people, and I hope - even believe - that
the moment is close at hand when they will obtain freedom,
independence, and the right of return. The liberation of Gaza is
but the beginning of the end of this protracted occupation. I am
certain that those who have succeeded in forcing the occupiers out
the Gaza Strip are able to do the same in the West Bank and East
Jerusalem. The occupation is living its final stages and the
Israeli attempts to salvage it are bound to meet with
failure.
It is difficult to really savor personal freedom unless the
Palestinian people have achieved freedom first. In the past few
decades, several prisoner exchange deals have taken place, and I am
deeply confident that our people will not forget or abandon their
prisoners. Nor can I envision a Palestinian leader or government
signing an agreement that does not stipulate the release of all
prisoners - whose number is growing by the day - and leaves them
hostages in the occupier's hands.
Ever since my detention, many rumors have been circulated with
respect to my release. Sometimes it was as a swap with Azzam Azzam,
the Israeli spy who was incarcerated in Egypt, or with [Jonathan]
Pollard, or in return for the search for Ron Arad. Other times it
was as part of an exchange with Hizbullah, or as part of an
initiative to bolster and support Abu Mazen. The truth of the
matter is that I am still in prison and with me are ten thousand
male and female detainees, most of whom were jailed at a young age
and are still languishing in Israeli prisons.
The absence of Arafat has, among other things, resulted in a
leadership crisis in Fateh. Will the new generation of leaders be
capable of filling this vacuum and solving the looming
crisis?
Arafat's martyrdom has caused a big void both in Fateh and
nationally. He is a symbol and an irreplaceable leader and I would
have wished he would have accepted to hold the 6th conference of
the Fateh Movement before his untimely demise. We tried hard, I and
other leaders and cadres of the movement, to convince him to do it,
as no conference had been held in over two decades. In my view, it
is the cause of the failings and stagnation of Fateh. The outcome
of the latest legislative elections is but one of the results of
having failed to hold the conference, added to that is the absence
of organization and cohesion within the movement, and the lack of
innovation on the leadership level. This has led many prominent and
capable leaders and cadres both from the homeland and the Diaspora
to choose not to form part of the leadership councils. We are
anticipating a conference that will embody the unity of the
movement and will consolidate its position as the leader of the
Palestinian national struggle. The time has come to open the doors
for a young generation of activists which can be entrusted with the
leadership institutions of the movement.
The crisis of Fateh has resulted in the movement losing its
place in the PA government. Can Fateh live with this unprecedented
situation of being in the opposition?
Fateh was and still is the pioneer of the great initiatives, from
the armed uprising to the holding of fair and democratic elections.
The movement will be a model responsible national opposition and
will safeguard the democratic experience. Whoever believes that the
fate of Fateh is tied to the number of seats in parliament and the
number of ministers in the government is mistaken. The priority for
Fateh will remain the realization of the national goals, and
holding on to the resistance option in order to achieve these
goals.
Is the trend, represented by Marwan Barghouthi, within Fateh
still alive? And what is your vision for getting Fateh out of its
crisis?
I am honored to represent Fateh and its illustrious history of
struggle. Fateh has given scores of martyrs, prisoners, and
fighters. Over the decades, it has led, and continues to lead in
its role as a resistance movement that strives to liberate the
homeland and to secure the return of the refugees. We believe in
the necessity of consolidating the democratic system among Fateh
and the Palestinian people, and in the importance of the
partnership between the generations and between the Palestinians in
the homeland and the Diaspora.
The arrival of Hamas to the Authority gives rise to the theory
of the Islamization of Palestinian society through the democratic
option.
I believe that Hamas is fully aware of the priorities of the
Palestinian people in its entirety, which are to end the
occupation, to achieve freedom and independence, to secure the
return of the refugees, and to safeguard the democratic character
of Palestinian society. We will work to preserve the democratic and
pluralistic principles within the political order. And we will work
to preserve the social, economic and political gains, and protect
and fight for individual freedoms and rights of all members of the
society. We are proud of our legislation for the empowerment of
women which will allow them to have representations in local
councils and the PLC - an unprecedented event in the Arab world.
Although it falls far short of our ambitions, we will present an
amendment to the law with a view of obtaining a 30-percent quota of
seats for women in the PLC.
Is Hamas capable of building a state? Or will it, through its
presence in the PA, build a broad social base for an Islamic state
in Palestine?
As I have mentioned, Hamas is fully cognizant of the priorities of
our people. Hamas and its government have to devote all their
potentials and capabilities to work towards that end. The
preoccupation with internal issues - albeit vital - must not lead
the government and everybody else to lose sight of the primary goal
of our people, which is freedom and state-building, and for which
Fateh has laid the foundation as represented by the PA. This is the
task facing the Palestinian people as a whole with all its forces,
parties, and institutions. It is incumbent on the Palestinian
government to preserve the gains achieved so far, to capitalize on
them and to increase them.
Is the option of an economic separation with Israel a solution
that will work in favor of the continuation of a peace settlement
and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state? Or does
it pose the possibility of an intractable economic crisis,
according to the estimation of some Palestinians?
The Palestinian economic strategy is supposed to lead to the
liberation of the economy from dependence on the Israeli side.
However, this requires Palestinian sovereignty over the crossing
points, the borders, the airport and seaport. It also calls for the
opening of Arab markets to Palestinian products and a future
enhancement of the work system. But there are still very real
difficulties facing the implementation of this important national
aim. It is difficult to build a free economic system under
occupation with all its restrictions. The Palestinian government
has to encourage Palestinian products and to discourage Israeli
products and produce.
How do you anticipate the Palestinians, the PA, and the Hamas
government will be able to get out of the present crisis?
There is no doubt that the Palestinians are facing a siege that is
growing tighter by the day. They are slipping into chaos on the
internal and security levels, and are struggling with a
multiplicity of programs and strategies. They will soon be facing a
dangerous challenge with the Israeli government's attempt at an
imposed solution. They will also have to find ways and mechanisms
to counter that, to revive their relations with the international
community and to garner its support, and to hold on to the gains
they have acquired so far.
The way out of this crisis, as I see it, is to immediately embark
on a strategic dialogue on the highest level between the
leaderships of Fateh and Hamas in order to reach a memorandum of
understanding or a strategic agreement between the two movements.
The next step would be to present the agreement and to enter into a
dialogue with all the forces, factions and figures to sound out
their opinion. Subsequently, a national conference should be held
with the participation of Palestinian leadership from the homeland
and the Diaspora. This document will have the advantage of
representing all the figures without exception, and includes the
incorporation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad within the PLO. Therefore,
what is needed is the rebuilding of the PLO institutions and the
restructuring of its councils. In addition, a clear-cut mechanism
of negotiation between the presidency and the government has to be
put in place, as well as a well-defined relationship between the
various resistance elements, which will include the creation of a
united resistance front. Finally, the government has to be formed
anew, with the participation of all the forces, and the proviso
that this should take place within a period of not more than three
months.