Sixty years after the Palestinian Nakba and the establishment of
the state of Israel, the faltering negotiations that are taking
place these days between the Palestinian Authority (PA) - under the
banner of the PLO - and the Israeli government could end in a
settlement that would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian
state. It is possible that the two parties are secretly holding
intensive parallel negotiations, ignoring the reactions of
right-wing politicians in Israel or the disaffection on the Arab
street.
American and Israeli decision-makers believe that engaging in these
intensive discussions would suggest sufficient success for the
achievement of peace in the region, after an agreement is reached
regarding the conditions for the establishment of a Palestinian
state - a state whose borders will neither reach the 1967 lines nor
include East Jerusalem as its capital, and that renounces the right
of return for the Palestinian refugees. Israel and the American
administration have worked hard to turn the demand for a
Palestinian state into a package that diminishes all the
Palestinian national rights and liquidates them.
Why Arafat Rejected Camp David
It is worth pondering the import of Yasser Arafat's rejection of a
similar offer at Camp David. His rejection did not necessarily
spring from his cleaving to the constants - although this is not to
be discounted - but to his having grasped the fact that a solution
of this type lacked legitimacy from an Arab and Palestinian
standpoint. Arafat had tied his personal and political destiny to
the negotiations, after the experience of the First Gulf War; after
the confinement of the PLO in Tunis in the wake of its expulsion
from Beirut; after the unraveling of the Soviet Union; and after
the dead end reached by the intifada. He did not accept the offer
even after he was held hostage under Israeli siege in al-Muqata'a.
And he paid the price for his rejection. The official Arab mourning
of his passing, including by a large part of the leadership in his
entourage, was no doubt tinged with a sigh of relief. They were rid
of the "obstacle" to a process whose wheels Arafat himself had set
in motion and that resumed their turning after his death.
Perhaps a settlement will not be reached. However, one must not
discard the possibility of the parties arriving at some form of
guiding principle regarding a permanent settlement, in a spirit
that had been rejected by Arafat, but which could serve as an
election platform for Ehud Olmert and a subject for a referendum
for President Mahmoud Abbas. If a settlement is not reached, the
impact on the Arab and Palestinian arenas will be all too clear:
the strengthening of the rejectionist axis that rests on the
continuation of resistance, in spite of the fact that some will
carry on with the peace process for years to come.
If a solution of the kind that is being negotiated is concluded,
this does not mean that the conflict has come to its inevitable
end. This settlement is not the two-state solution that enjoys a
modicum of legitimacy, although it does meet with the satisfaction
of some Arab leaders. The latter acquiesce to whatever the
Palestinian leadership accepts because they want to be rid of the
burden of the Palestinian question. What will emanate from these
negotiations and will be passed off as the two-state solution does
not enjoy Arab legitimacy on the popular or public opinion level;
it is not considered as a settlement for the outstanding account
with the Palestinian people and as reparation for the injustice
that has befallen them.
A Settlement Lacking Legitimacy
This might seem a truism. The fact remains that such a settlement
leaves many substantive issues outside the parameters of a
solution, such as the question of refugees. It is at the heart of
the problem, carries great qualitative and psychological weight and
deals with the real suffering of millions of people. What this
settlement offers the refugees is a change in name from "refugees"
to "dependents" of overseas embassies or to "expatriates."
Moreover, Israel will not stay put in Jerusalem once an agreement
has been crafted, but will daily exacerbate the wounds by the
continued Judaization of East Jerusalem, its lands and holy sites.
Israel's Jewishness will deepen and so will its radicalism and
arrogance vis-à-vis its Arab citizens. The latter will find
themselves faced with the choice of total loyalty to Israel to the
extent of serving in the army or doing national service, or that of
disenfranchisement and inequality of rights. As for those who
insist on maintaining their national identity inside Israel, they
have seen ample expression of Israel's position regarding the
matter.
In addition, the discrepancy will remain between the development
and modernization of the nascent Palestinian state and its army and
Israel as a state alien to its neighborhood, for Israel will be
constantly concerned by and apprehensive of any development
occurring within that Arab state. Israel's paradoxical democracy
will persist in relation to the Arabs because it dreads the
majority and its shifting public opinion.
If there is any question about legitimacy, it is the Palestinian
people that can impart legitimacy to the settlement regionally. But
the resolution that is offered is being concluded through an
alliance with one Palestinian party against others - one of which
won the local elections. Also, because it has discarded the refugee
question, a solution along those lines does not enjoy legitimacy
among the Diaspora.
Not only does this settlement lack legitimacy on the Palestinian
level, it also constitutes a source of internal strife. Even its
promotion before it has actually been concluded is taking place
through the shelling of a part of the Palestinian people, starving
them and debilitating them to a point where they won't have any
stamina left to refuse. These are not indicators of
legitimacy.
Arab Responsibility
Regionally, this type of settlement is being promoted through the
American hegemony and the conflicting regional axes, one of which
is bound to turn the absence of justice in this settlement into a
battle-cry slogan. The settlement is being promoted without
affecting the disillusionment of the Arab street with the peace
process, its lack of faith in Israel's desire for a just peace, or
its rejection of the privileges Israel enjoys among the
international community.
The Arabs bear a large part of the responsibility for the
predicament that is culminating in such a settlement, as well as
for the American alliance with Israel and for international double
standards. There is no doubt that the impunity with which Israel
deals with the Palestinians to "dissuade" them from resorting to
the resistance option and to persuade them to accept Israel's
conditions is fostering resentment and fueling the sense of
injustice. It is true that the Arab street is powerless against the
system, yet it does not look with complacency upon the ongoing
collusion of some Arab parties with Israel against the results of
the Palestinian elections; it does not view positively the
continuation of negotiations with Israel while it is besieging and
killing the civilians in the heart of the Arab world. The Arab
street also dismisses the claim that the settlements are an
obstacle to negotiations as mere lip service in order to proceed
with the negotiations in spite of the settlements, and as disregard
for Arab public opinion on the part of Arab states that have it in
their power to do much more.
Opting for an Impregnable Fortress
Thus, after the rejection by Israel of what is viewed widely in
Arab and Palestinian circles as legitimate solutions, whether a
solution is concluded or not becomes an academic question. For a
settlement that takes place outside the framework of what
constitutes a just solution can only mean that Israel has opted for
the paradigm of perpetual conflict, which persists in spite of
settlements and alliances. It is a choice the Arab region has known
in the past - the example of the Crusader states. Israel has
rejected the one-state option and the two-state option. And whether
or not it succeeds in imposing the kind of settlement that is being
negotiated secretly and overtly, it has chosen to live in permanent
strife for the foreseeable future, without acquiring legitimacy
from its neighbors.
The intention here is neither to draw parallels between this
contemporary conflict and the Crusader invasions nor to search for
areas of similarity between them; naturally, the historical context
is entirely different. However, reference can be made to the
alliances that proliferated between the Crusader states and their
neighboring states, including with certain emirs against others in
Egypt and Bilad as-Sham (Greater Syria). It won't be difficult to
find similar examples in modern times.
We can even recall the burning of the Holy Sepulcher during the
days of al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah that provided the impetus for later
Crusader invasions. And if we mention the role played by the
northern emirates in facilitating the passage of Crusader armies
from Antioch and even Jerusalem, and the exploitation of religion
for the purpose of mobilization and militarization… even if
we did all that and found comparable examples in our age, we will
always find those who will rightly retort that the international
order now bears no resemblance to those Arab emirates and Crusader
states. The solidness and stability of the modern Arab states and
the Jewish state differ radically. The role of religion has
changed, and Israel's relationship with the West is stronger and
tighter than that of the Crusader states with their mother
countries. Moreover, there is a big technological and scientific
gap between the Arabs and Israel today, a gap that did not exist
between the four Crusader states and their Arab, Turkish and
Persian neighbors. By the same token, the Arabs were not like
today's Arabs with their greatly enhanced national awareness, their
shared preoccupations and their apprehension of colonialism.
Therefore, one is not so naïve as to attempt to draw
comparisons.
What is of interest in this paradigm is that a state foreign to the
region was established through military and colonialist invasions.
It settled without attempting to integrate with the inhabitants but
through the erection of impregnable fortresses and the reliance on
militarism, and through betting on the existence of rivalries and
strife among political entities that are built on influence or
vested interests.
A Protracted Conflict
This means that in the absence of a legitimate solution, Israel has
chosen to remain an impregnable fortress behind an iron wall. It
survives on the strength of deterrence, on the one hand, and on
Arab-Arab discord on the other - which naturally comprises
Arab-Israeli settlements. The road to permanent strife chosen by
the Crusader states was also paved with settlements.
This is a permanent situation, and it is correct to say that, to
date, it is a choice deeply rooted in Israeli public opinion and
based on elements of strength predicated on a distorted and
unwholesome relationship with the United States unparalleled among
other states.
There does not appear on the horizon any possibility that Israel
will accept either of the solutions: the one-state or the
two-state. The Arab and Palestinian peoples have to expect a
situation where attaining any rights could prove impossible.
Nonetheless, these rights must not be relinquished and unfair
solutions must be rejected. But alongside closing the door to
unjust settlements, a solid democratic program should be put
forward leading to a solution for the Arabs and the Jews within the
framework of a comprehensive vision for the entire Arab
region.
This entails the development and preservation of the means of
livelihood by the Palestinians, resisting, at the same time, the
consolidation of Israeli facts on the ground. This will achieve
partial but significant gains that will prevent turning a colonial
situation into a state of normalcy. But the buildup, in the long
run, will be through the regional Arab (including Palestinian)
challenge to Israel; the modernization of the Arab states,
societies and economies; and the fulfillment of the elements of
sumud (steadfastness), including growth, democracy and the power of
deterrence.
This is a protracted conflict that has to be conducted correctly.
Time is not on the side of Israel, but on the side of the one who
knows how to exploit it properly. This is one of the most important
morals of the past 60 years.