Introduction
One of the most significant indicators of authoritarianism and totalitarianism is censorship, which is frequently accompanied by selfcensorship. Censorship plays a critical role in shaping societies because it restricts access to information that may illuminate social, political, and moral issues. By limiting freedom of expression and obstructing the free flow of information, censorship constrains public deliberation and weakens democratic processes. An uninformed society may become unstable and difficult to govern or, conversely, excessively compliant and authoritarian, as information and knowledge are restricted, controlled, and manipulated, reminiscent of the dystopian society depicted in George Orwell’s “Nineteen Eighty-Four.” Yet, such dynamics are not confined to overtly totalitarian regimes. Even democratic governments and institutions may possess vested interests in restricting information and dissenting opinions in order to avoid criticism, limit accountability, reduce transparency, and preserve political power.
The free circulation of information within a society constitutes a hallmark of good governance, transparency, and democratic accountability. It reduces the capacity of those in power to conceal misconduct and contributes to ethical conduct in both intragroup and intergroup relations. Above all, it enables the meaningful participation of an informed electorate capable of critically evaluating the goals, policies, and actions of political leaders, institutions, and society as a whole.
The Initial Steps of the State
Israel began its existence as an independent state under highly centralized political leadership. The regime led by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion displayed strong authoritarian tendencies in several domains, particularly regarding the control of information and public discourse. Ben-Gurion regarded national unity, state security, and ideological cohesion as essential conditions for the survival of the newly established state, especially in the aftermath of the 1948 war and amid continuing regional conflict. Within this context, both formal censorship and informal mechanisms encouraging self-censorship developed across political institutions, the military, academia, literature, and the press. Even private letters were censored by censors sitting in the post office.
One of the clearest manifestations of formal censorship was the system of military censorship imposed on newspapers and other publications. During the 1950s, Israeli newspapers were required to submit security-related material to the Military Censor prior to publication. The censorship system was justified primarily on grounds of national security, particularly in light of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, concerns regarding espionage, and issues related to military preparedness. Journalists and editors who violated censorship regulations could face legal sanctions, including the temporary closure of newspapers. Over time, many media organizations internalized these restrictions and refrained from publishing sensitive criticism even before state intervention occurred. Consequently, self-censorship became institutionalized within journalistic culture. Ben-Gurion even organized an Editor’s Committee in which editors and publishers of major media were given access to security secrets on condition that they would not be published.
Although the dominant state ideology contributed to the consolidation and stabilization of the new state, it also encouraged conformity and discouraged open criticism. Many journalists, academics, and public intellectuals internalized the belief that public dissent could weaken the fragile state during a period characterized by continuous military conflict, economic hardship, and large-scale immigration. Self-censorship therefore evolved not merely as a reaction to governmental pressure, but also as a socially embedded norm rooted in collective perceptions of national vulnerability and responsibility.
Another significant sphere in which censorship operated concerned the treatment of political opposition, particularly groups perceived by Ben-Gurion and the ruling establishment as threatening national unity. Members of the Communist Party, especially those maintaining ties with Arab political movements or the Soviet bloc, were frequently monitored by the security services. Arab newspapers operating within Israel faced particularly severe restrictions during the years of military rule imposed on Arab citizens between 1948 and 1966. Publications that sharply criticized government policies risked suspension or closure, and editors often moderated their language in order to ensure political survival and economic viability. The existence of a Military Government between 1949 and 1966 over Arab localities further contributed to widespread self-censorship among Arab intellectuals, journalists, and political activists.
Other social spheres reflected similar dynamics. Educational materials often emphasized ideological and nation-building narratives while providing limited space for critical or alternative perspectives. Academia also tended, to a considerable extent, to conform to the dominant political climate of the period. Writers and artists frequently avoided direct criticism of the state, the military, or foundational Zionist narratives during the early decades of statehood. The combination of institutional censorship and voluntary self censorship significantly shaped Israeli democratic culture during its formative years and left a lasting impact on the relationship between the state, the media, academia, and intellectual life more broadly.1
Although dissenting voices certainly existed during this period, such as Uri Avnery’s maverick HaOlam Hazeh (This World) weekly, public criticism of the army, the security establishment, or central Zionist narratives remained relatively limited. The patterns established during these formative decades continued to influence Israeli political and cultural life in subsequent years.
The Further Development of the State
Israel has never been entirely free from censorship or self-censorship, although the degree, forms, and intensity of these phenomena have varied considerably across historical periods, political contexts, and social spheres. Like many states established under conditions of war and protracted national conflict, Israel developed powerful security institutions from its inception, and these institutions substantially shaped relations between the state, the media, academia, and public discourse. Simultaneously, however, Israel also developed strong democratic institutions, an active and diverse press, an independent judiciary, and a vibrant culture of political debate. Consequently, Israeli history has been characterized by a persistent tension between commitments to freedom of expression and pressures for national unity, security, and social cohesion. But even in this period censorship and self censorship existed. Uri Avnery the known nonconformist did not publish the known second mini-Nakba that occurred during 1967 war when about 350,000 Palestinians and Druze were expelled during the war. He complained about it to the high figures in the military system but did not publish the immoral act in his weekly journal. In addition, soldiers from the left wing sector (left leaning kibbutz members) published following the 1967 war a book entitled “Siah Lochamin” (“Fighters’ Discourse,” published in English as “The Seventh Day”) describing immoral acts performed in the war — but they too self-censored themselves in the writing.
The period following the 1967 war introduced new political and moral tensions into Israeli society. Israel’s control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip generated increasing public debate concerning occupation, democracy, civil rights, and the status of Palestinians under Israeli rule. The occupation had a major influence on the democratic nature of the society, especially by the fact that Palestinians have begun a long road of resistance and there has been objections to the occupation and the Jewish settlement of the occupied territories. Both processes have required censorship and self censorship.
In spite of the occupation, during the 1970s and 1980s, investigative journalism became significantly more assertive, particularly after the Yom Kippur War, which undermined public trust in both political and military leadership. Newspapers such as Haaretz, together with investigative television programs, expanded criticism of government policies and security practices. At the same time, the Israeli Supreme Court strengthened legal protections for freedom of expression through several landmark rulings, thereby reinforcing liberal-democratic norms within the public sphere. But at the same time it legitimized the occupation and Jewish supremacy. Many scholars argue that the 1980s and 1990s constituted one of the relatively more open periods in Israeli public discourse. During these decades, the “New Historians,” including Benny Morris, Ilan Pappé, and Avi Shlaim, challenged dominant national narratives concerning the 1948 war and the Palestinian refugee issue. Simultaneously, critical sociology, post-Zionist debates, and human rights discourse gained greater legitimacy within universities, literature, cinema, and journalism. The Oslo Accords period further widened the boundaries of legitimate political discussion for many sectors of Israeli society and encouraged more open engagement with questions of peace, identity, and coexistence.
Nevertheless, even during these comparatively open decades, significant limitations persisted. Military censorship remained active in matters defined as relating to national security. Arab citizens of Israel frequently encountered narrower boundaries of acceptable public speech than Jewish citizens, while Palestinians living in the occupied territories remained subject to direct military restrictions on political expression and publication. Moreover, strong informal pressures toward conformity often intensified during periods of violence and political crisis, particularly during wars, the First Intifada and the Second Intifada. During such periods, journalists, academics, artists, and public intellectuals frequently encountered social and political expectations to demonstrate loyalty and
solidarity, thereby reinforcing patterns of self-censorship even in the absence of direct state intervention.
The Regressive Period
Since the 2000s, many observers have identified a renewed strengthening of nationalist discourse and increasing pressures on dissent, particularly during the governments of Benjamin Netanyahu (1996–1999, 2009–2021, and from 2022 onward).
The contemporary period since 2022 has generated growing public and academic debate concerning censorship and self-censorship in Israeli society, particularly in the context of attempts by the political leadership leading the coalition to transform the character of the regime in a more authoritarian direction. These debates have intensified amid controversies surrounding judicial reform, the concentration of executive power, growing political polarization, and increasing tensions between liberal-democratic principles and majoritarian nationalist politics. Critics argue that these developments have been accompanied by heightened pressures on independent institutions, the media, academia, civil society organizations, and dissenting voices, thereby contributing to broader processes of censorship and self-censorship within Israeli public life.
Within the media sphere, concerns regarding political influence and the concentration of power over public discourse have become increasingly prominent. Netanyahu’s long and conflictual relationship with major Israeli media organizations has been widely documented. On the one hand, Netanyahu repeatedly accused segments of the mainstream media of ideological bias against him and against the political right. On the other hand, critics argued that his governments sought to weaken independent journalism while simultaneously promoting politically supportive media outlets. One notable example involved the close relationship between Netanyahu and Yisrael Hayom (Israel Today), the free daily newspaper owned by the late American businessman Sheldon Adelson and later by his widow Miriam Adelson. Scholars and journalists argued that the newspaper functioned for years as a highly supportive platform for Netanyahu’s political agenda, significantly reshaping the Israeli media landscape and weakening competing newspapers such as Yedioth Ahronoth. In later years, a similar role was increasingly associated with television Channel 14, which openly aligned itself with messages supportive of Netanyahu and the Likud.
Another prominent example emerged through the so-called “Case 2000” investigation, which formed part of Netanyahu’s broader corruption trials. The case concerned alleged negotiations between Netanyahu and Arnon Mozes, publisher of Yedioth Ahronoth, regarding favourable media coverage in exchange for legislation designed to weaken Yisrael Hayom. Although the legal proceedings focused primarily on allegations of corruption, the affair exposed the extent to which political and media elites interacted in attempts to shape public discourse and influence public opinion.
Beyond direct political intervention, many journalists reported increasing pressures to avoid criticism on highly sensitive issues such as military operations, wartime governmental policies, and allegations concerning human rights violations. During periods of armed conflict, particularly after the events of October 2023, several commentators and reporters described a public atmosphere in which dissenting voices were frequently portrayed as undermining national solidarity or assisting hostile actors. Foreign journalist who writes articles which are considered by the government anti-Israeli are expelled or forbidden to enter Israel. Special treatment of censorship and delegitimization get journalists who write about torturing Palestinians. Since October 7th, and actually since the 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza, no Israeli or international journalists have been allowed by the Israeli government to enter Gaza, except infrequently as embedded with IDF units. Such dynamics contributed to extensive self-censorship within mainstream journalism and broadcasting channels and other media institutions.
Censorship and self-censorship have also become increasingly visible within the cultural sphere. Over the past decade, several Israeli ministers of culture, particularly Miri Regev, openly promoted the view that state-funded cultural institutions should demonstrate loyalty to the state and refrain from supporting works perceived as anti-Zionist or sympathetic to Palestinian resistance. Regev, as well as the current Minister of Culture and Sport Miki Zohar, repeatedly threatened to reduce funding for theaters, filmmakers, and artists whose productions criticized government policies or commemorated the Palestinian Nakba. Consequently, filmmakers and artists increasingly reported adapting their work in anticipation of political backlash or financial repercussions. Since many cultural institutions in Israel depend heavily on state funding, the threat of budget reductions created strong incentives toward self-censorship. These pressures were particularly pronounced among Arab artists and left-wing Jewish creators who feared public campaigns, political attacks, or accusations of disloyalty. Similar dynamics also emerged in relation to international cultural events, where Israeli artists critical of government policies sometimes faced hostility domestically while simultaneously encountering boycott campaigns abroad.
The educational system similarly became an important arena of ideological and political struggle. Governments led by Benjamin Netanyahu increasingly emphasized Jewish nationalism, Zionist identity, and patriotic education to a greater extent than many previous administrations. Debates surrounding school curricula intensified, particularly regarding the teaching of democracy, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, minority rights, and the historical narratives presented to students. One prominent controversy concerned revisions to the civics textbook To Be Citizens in Israel. Critics argued that newer editions placed greater emphasis on the Jewish character of the state while reducing attention to liberal-democratic principles, equality, and minority rights.
Educational organizations and teachers also reported growing reluctance to address controversial political topics in classrooms, especially following public campaigns targeting educators accused of expressing “anti-state” or insufficiently patriotic positions. Right-wing activist organizations, including Im Tirtzu, monitored social media posts and classroom discussions, and in some cases encouraged students to record teachers perceived as politically critical. It has been reported that ministry of education practices surveillance after Jewish teachers who are independent and provide to students with objective material about the Israeli regime and in general after Arab teachers. Such developments contributed to an atmosphere in which many educators preferred to avoid politically sensitive discussions altogether, thereby reinforcing patterns of self-censorship within the educational system.
In academia, debates concerning academic freedom and political pressure intensified significantly during Netanyahu’s years in office. Israeli universities continued to maintain relatively high levels of institutional autonomy compared to many countries in the region; nevertheless, scholars increasingly described growing pressures affecting research agendas, public engagement, and campus discourse. Organizations such as Im Tirtzu and NGO Monitor launched public campaigns against academics accused of holding “post-Zionist” or anti-Israel positions. Public lists targeting university lecturers, intellectuals, and cultural figures alleged to display insufficient patriotism generated broader concerns regarding intimidation, stigmatization, and delegitimization.
The climate became particularly tense following the events of October 2023 and the subsequent war in Gaza. Arab students and faculty members reported investigations, suspensions, and disciplinary measures related to social media posts interpreted as supporting terrorism or criticizing Israeli military actions. At several universities, public expressions of Palestinian solidarity were heavily restricted due to security concerns and fears of incitement. At the same time, Jewish academics critical of government policies also described increasing hostility and social pressure. Although universities generally continued to defend formal principles of academic freedom, many scholars acknowledged that self-censorship had become increasingly widespread, particularly regarding politically sensitive subjects such as occupation, settler violence, allegations of apartheid, and military conduct.
Digital media and social networks further intensified these dynamics by blurring the boundaries between formal censorship, institutional pressure, and voluntary self-censorship. Rather than operating solely through explicit state prohibitions, contemporary forms of control frequently functioned through economic dependency, reputational threats, public intimidation, online harassment, and nationalist mobilization.
Overall, Netanyahu’s most recent period in office illustrates how censorship in pseudo-democratic societies often operates not only through direct legal restrictions, but also through indirect mechanisms that shape the boundaries of legitimate public discourse. The interaction between security concerns, political nationalism, media concentration, and social polarization contributed to expanding patterns of self-censorship across multiple domains of Israeli public life.2
One of the most striking examples of self-censorship has been the lack of visual images of death and destruction in Gaza in the electronic media, and in the majority of the mainstream print media. The average Israeli simply has not seen the images that most people around the world see. Investigative journalist Raviv Drucker gave the following explanation for this in The Guardian: “Journalists see their role now, or part of their role, to help the state win the war.” While Anat Saragusti who is in charge of freedom of the press in the Israeli Journalist’s Union says that “They cover the Palestinians only in the framework of security.”
These developments do not generally resemble classical authoritarian censorship in which the state exercises total control over the media and public debate. Israel continues to contain critical newspapers such as Haaretz, digital platforms including Local Call and +972 Magazine, opposition political parties, activist organizations, and relatively independent judicial institutions. Local Call published that during 2025 the digital platform was partial censored 4,974 times and fully censored 753 times. These numbers of censorship appeared also in 2024. Critics argue that indirect mechanisms, including political intimidation, delegitimization campaigns, social media harassment, financial pressures, and accusations of disloyalty, have significantly expanded self-censorship within academia, culture, journalism, and education.
Summary
Historically, Israel has never been entirely free from censorship or self-censorship. Rather, Israeli society has continuously negotiated the boundaries between democratic openness and perceived national security imperatives. The balance between these competing principles has shifted over time in response to wars, political transformations, ideological struggles, and broader social changes within Israeli society.
The future does not appear particularly promising from the perspective of liberal-democratic development. Many observers argue that significant segments of Israeli society have increasingly shifted toward more hawkish, nationalist, religious, and exclusionary political orientations. These trends have been reinforced by prolonged conflict, wars, occupation, demographic changes, growing religious influence within politics, security fears, systematic indoctrination carried out by authorities and deepening polarization between Jewish and Arab citizens, as well as between ideological camps within Jewish society itself.
One indication concerns the persistent reluctance of major opposition parties to establish governing coalitions with Arab political parties, despite the latter representing a substantial portion of Israel’s citizenry that may prevent them from being able to form alternative government. Although Arab parties have become increasingly important within parliamentary politics, their political legitimacy as potential coalition partners continues to face significant resistance across broad sectors of the Israeli political system. This reluctance reflects deeper structural tensions regarding equality, citizenship, and the inclusive character of Israeli democracy. The liberal democracy that is promised by the opposition is far away in the horizon.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------