Water is a commodity. In water-rich regions of the world, water is
bought and sold just as oil, wheat, rice and even gold. In
water-poor regions of the world, wars are fought over control of
the water resources. Our region is, of course, a water-poor region.
Wars in the Middle East, if not fought directly over water, have
had water within their marginal concerns. Is the "water conflict"
between Israel and the Palestinians the kind of conflict which will
lead to a war? Is the water issue even a major issue in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Many researchers answer "yes" to
these two questions. This paper is a first attempt to bring the
issue of water between Israel and Palestine into a more realistic
proportion. It will attempt to "demystify" the water issue in this
particular part of the conflict. The paper will not minimize the
question of water with regard to Israeli-Syrian relations; the
focus here is solely on the Israeli-Palestinian track.
Israel and Palestine are both part of the Jordan River Basin,
therefore, both are thought to be competitors over the same limited
water resources. The Jordan River is some 360 krns long and drains
a total area of 18,300 sq. kms. The portion of the River which
concerns the Israel-Palestine track is the lower Jordan River
flowing from the Sea of Tiberias southward through the West Bank
into the Dead Sea. This water is quite brackish since its sources
are mainly return irrigation' flows and flows from saline springs.
There is about 100 million cubic meters per year (mcmy) of brackish
water available from the source.'
The main source of water for the West Bank is what is commonly
called the mountain aquifer. The mountain aquifer is a
transboundary water resource shared by Israel and Palestine. The
major recharge area of the mountain aquifer, (where the rains fall)
is in the West Bank. Some 78% of the recharge area is within the
Palestinian territories.2 However, present optimal pumping areas
are found on the western side of the "Green Line" inside of Israel
proper. This is due to the topography of the region (the cheaper
area for pumping the water is in the lowlands inside of Israel).
Thus, Israel, which uses most of the water of the mountain aquifer,
actually pumps this water inside Israel proper. This water source
accounts for about 25% of Israel's total water consumption.
The mountain aquifer can be divided into three sub-aquifers: the
western, the north-eastern aquifer and the eastern aquifer. The
western aquifer flows naturally towards the Mediterranean Sea to
the outlets at Rosh Ha'ayin (Ras al Ain) and the Yarkon River (el
Uja) near Tel Aviv. The north-eastern aquifer also drains naturally
into Israel in the areas of the Jezreel and Beit Shean Valleys. The
eastern aquifer drains naturally into the Jordan Valley and the
Dead Sea area. Of the three sub-sections of the mountain aquifer
only the western and north-eastern sub-sections are transboundary
water resources shared by Israel and Palestine. The eastern aquifer
is purely a Palestinian water resource and should not be of concern
to Israel.
Quantities and Functions
Let's look at the numbers: the total potential of the mountain
aquifer is estimated to be some 632 mcmy which includes 452 mcmy of
fresh water and 180 mcmy of brackish water. Of this, the eastern
aquifer (which is purely a Palestinian water resource) contains 81
mcmy of fresh water and 70 mcmy of brackish water. The
north-eastern aquifer contains 61 mcmy of fresh water and 70 mcmy
of brackish water, while the western aquifer contains 310 mcmy of
fresh water and 40 mcmy of brackish water. So based upon these
figures, the water in conflict in the West Bank is a total of 371
mcmy of fresh water and 110 mcmy of brackish water.3
The total water available from the mountain aquifer is 623 mcmy of
which Israel is using 413 mcmy (fresh and brackish) or 66% of the
total of the aquifer. This accounts for some 23% of Israel's total
(total consumption being estimated at 1,800 mcmy). Of the fresh
water available from this source, Israel currently consumes 303
mcmy or 67%. An additional 35 mcmy of fresh water is currently
being used by Israeli settlements from the eastern aquifer which is
a purely Palestinian source making the total Israeli consumption of
fresh water from the mountain aquifer 338 mcmy. The Palestinians
are left with a total of 110 mcmy (90 mcmy fresh and 20 mcmy
brackish) accounting for 20% of the fresh water and 17.4% of the
total.
In the West Bank (for Palestinians) water serves two basic
functions: domestic use and agricultural use. (Industrial use of
water in the West Bank is currently very low). In 1990, there was a
total water consumption in the West Bank (by Palestinians) of 118
million cubic meters (mcm): 29 mcm for domestic use,S mcm for
industry and 84 mcm for agriculture.4 The remaining 8 mcm above the
water available from the mountain aquifer comes from home
collection and from the Jordan River. Prof. Hisham Awartani has
calculated the estimated water needs of the West Bank in the year
2005 when the population of the West Bank will be 2.24 million. His
estimates are as follows: 144.7 mcm for domestic use, 29 mcm for
industry and 244 mcm for agriculture. Today the per capita use of
water in the West Bank is 31 cubic meters (cm) per person, and the
current Israeli per capita usage is about 100 em per person. Prof.
Awartani estimates a growth in the year 2005 to 64.6 em per person
in the West Bank. 5
Water Requirement
In calculating the total need for water in the West Bank, it is
important to determine how water is used. The agriculture sector is
the largest consumer of water. Today, nearly one-quarter of the
Palestinian population is employed in agriculture which accounts
for roughly one-quarter of the internal gross product. The
percentage of people employed in agriculture will probably decrease
as more modern technologies are used; however, the percentage of
irrigated land will increase (and should increase) if there will be
more water available.
In the West Bank there are 5.87 million dunums of land. Today some
95,000 dunums are being irrigated. According to Awartani, there are
a total of 172,000 dunums which are currently fit for irrigation
(fit meaning economically viable in terms of crop production) and
an additional 440,000 dunums which could be fit for certain types
of irrigated agriculture giving a total 612,000 of irrigable land.
At an average of 700 em per dunum, the expected need for
agricultural water in the West Bank in the year 2005 will be 424.4
mcmy. Together with the domestic and industrial needs, Palestinians
in the West Bank will require 602.1 mcmy (at 1992 levels of usage
for agriculture which will probably decrease with advanced
technologies in agriculture). This coincides with the total
available water from the mountain aquifer of 623 mcmy.
Fresh water is not only a commodity which is used, it can also be
produced (unlike oil). How much is water worth? The efficient price
of water is determined by the marginal cost of providing additional
or alternative water to any location. The highest price that water
can command is estimated to be about 80 cents (1992 prices) per
cubic meter. This is the cost of desalination at the shore.6 Israel
which uses 413 mcmy from the mountain aquifer must also take into
account the cost of conveying water, which in some cases is almost
as large as the cost of production. Using some complex mathematical
calculations, it seems that the replacement cost of West Bank water
for Israel would be about $1.00 per em. Thus at the present time,
if Israel were to relinquish its total claim on the West Bank
mountain aquifer, the total replacement cost of this water to
Israel would be no more than $413 million which is 0.67% of
Israel's GNP in 1993.
On the basis of the above analysis, the entirety of the water
conflict between Israel and the Palestinians over the mountain
aquifer amounts to 0.67% of Israel's GNP in 1993. Would any nation
wage war over such a small sum of money? This figure is even
smaller when one takes into account that the Palestinians are
presently not ready to significantly increase their water demand.
It will take a number of years before the Palestinian agricultural
sector will be ready to reach the levels indicated above. This time
would provide Israel with the ability to prepare for large scale
desalination projects.
Desalination
Desalination projects will be demanded in the region of the future.
There will not be enough water for any of the Jordan Basin
countries in another generation. There is, however, an unlimited
amount of saline water available from the sea. There is also a
substantial quantity of brackish water available in the fossil
water lakes under the Negev desert and brackish water is cheaper to
desalinate than sea water.
It would seem logical that, since desalination will eventually have
to provide the answer for the region's water needs, these projects
should begin today. The international community seems to be willing
to invest in these large regional projects. Israel, because of its
relative wealth and due to its technological abilities should lead
the region in these efforts.
Israel has often suggested that the Palestinians should look to
desalination to solve their water problems. Certainly, if this
suggestion is good for Palestinians it must also be good for
Israel. Water negotiations between Israel and Palestine should not
be blown out of proportion. This is not an issue which is going to
break the Israeli economy. The Palestinians, on the other hand,
with a GNP of $3 billion can hardly be expected to invest large
sums of capital in desalination projects at this time.
With the understanding that Israel will probably not simply
relinquish its claim on this water, it is suggested that the
following guidelines be adopted in the negotiations on water during
the interim period (and perhaps beyond): 1. These suggestions, if
accepted, will not prejudice any legitimate claims on water by
either party in the negotiations on the final status of the
Territories which will begin in the third year of the interim
period.
2. These suggestions are made with the understanding that a wider
agreement will be signed involving all of the riparians to the
Jordan River Basin.
3. Water is a basic human right. Every resident of the area between
the Mediterranean and the Jordan River has the same and equal
rights for high quality water.
4. The underlying principle in these suggestions is cooperation
between Israelis and Palestinians with regard to the use,
distribution, preservation, development and management of the joint
water resources.
5. As specified in the Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements (Article VII number 4), the
Palestinians should establish an independent water authority. This
water authority should be the responsible body which will control
and manage the use, distribution and preservation of the water
resources under its control.
6. These suggestions aim to establish the principle that equal
minimum standards for the allocation of water must be accepted and
implemented. It is recommended that a Minimum Water Requirement
(MWR) be established and that every resident of the area between
the Mediterranean and the Jordan River be allocated water (on per
capita basis) at the MWR rate.
7. 1he Palestinians should be granted immediate and full control of
the eastern aquifer (Wadi Kelt, Wadi Uja, Ein Fashkha). This
aquifer today provides for 81 mcm of fresh water and 70 mcm of
brackish water. Of this, 38 mcm of fresh water and 20 mcm of
brackish water are presently being used by Palestinians and 35 mcm
of fresh water are being used for Israeli settlements. An
additional 58 mcm of brackish water are currently unused.
8. As specified in the Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements (Article HI number 1), a Joint
Monitoring Commisssion should be established by Israel and the
Palestinians to monitor all joint water resources. These include
the mountain (western) aquifer, the Jordan River and the Ein Gedi
Systems.
9. As specified in the Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements (Article HI number 1), the Joint
Monitoring Commission would be charged with the implementation of
this agreement. The Joint Monitoring Commission should be charged
with setting pumping schedules which will be monitored by the
commission.
10. No unilateral action shall be taken by either side which will
change this agreement.
11. The Ein Gedi Systems is a joint resource and should be treated
as such. Arrangements should be made to provide sufficient fresh
water for the Israeli settlements on the Israeli side of the Green
Line (e.g. Kibbutz Ein Gedi). 12.1. The Jordan River is a joint
resource and arrangements should be made to supply fresh water to
the settlements in the Jordan Valley regardless of any potential
change in their status after the interim period, at the current
rate of 25 mcmy from the Upper Jordan to the farm communities in
the area. An additional 45 mcmy will continue to flow into the Sea
of Galilee.
12.2. A regional water institution for the Jordan River will be
established involving all riparians of the river and its sources.
This body will become a river basin management authority.
12.3. Negotiations will commence regarding the reconstruction and
the completion of the Unity Dam and the construction of the West
Ghor Canal.
13. The current Palestinian allocation from the mountain aquifer is
as follows: from the western basin the Palestinians receive 27 mcmy
from a total of 310 mcm of fresh water and 40 mcm of brackish
water. From the north-eastern basin, the Palestinians receive 25
mcmy from a total of 61 mcm of fresh water and 70 mcm of brackish
water. From the eastern basin the Palestinians receive 38 mcmy of
fresh water and 20 mcmy of brackish water from a total of 81 mcm of
fresh water and 70 mcm of brackish water. The Israeli settlements
use a total of some 50 mcmy from these three sources. If this is
not possible for technical reasons, it is recommended that the
Palestinians be given an additional 50 mcmy from sources suggested
by Israel. Thus the Palestinians would reach a level of 180 mcmy
from the mountain aquifer.
14. With regards to the Gaza Strip, the current safe yield of the
Gaza aquifer is estimated to be 60 mcmy. This water will be used
for the Palestinians and by the Palestinians. The Israeli
settlements in Gaza will receive water piped in from water sources
outside of the Gaza Strip and its vicinity. Today these settlements
use about 6 mcmy.
15. The Palestinian water authority in conjunction with the Israeli
water authority should undertake the monitoring and publication of
all data concerning the planning, use and allocation of its
resources. Data on water resources is not in the private domain. It
must be in the public domain and the public must have access to
adequate and verifiable data. Israelis and Palestinians will
cooperate in the sharing of all data with regard to the joint water
resources.
16. As specified in the Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements (Annex III number 10), a joint
commission will be established to set up and determine
environmental standards, to establish criteria for waste water
irrigation and to set up standards for the disposal of solid waste
which could pollute the groundwater.
17. As specified in the Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements (Annex III number 1), a joint planning
body shall be established which should be charged with the
investigation of additional sources of water. This body should be
funded by monies raised locally and in the international community.
This commission will work to assure that capital resources are
available for assessment, research and joint monitoring. This
commission should make recommendations with regard to increasing
amounts of available fresh water in the region including
desalination and other forms of importation of water.
18. Issues regarding claims and counter-claims for compensation
will be delayed until the discussions on the final status of the
Territories.
19. Resolutions of disputes will be dealt with through the
mechanism set forth in the Declaration of Principles (Article
XV).
A Proper Perspective
The above proposals are quite specific. The underlying principles
behind them are that Israel should be generous in the disposition
of the transboundary water resources with Palestinians.
Palestinians and Israelis should together approach the
international community with mid and long¬term plans for
desalination schemes which will allow the Palestinians to utilize
to a maximal potential the water available in the mountain aquifer.
Translating this specific water problem into pure economics allows
Israel to relate to the problem in terms which are not life and
death (as the water issue is often presented). It is suggested that
Israel view its water future through policies which will lead to
reforms in agriculture (growing different crops than it does today)
together with investments in research and development technologies
of water desalination.
Israel's economic future is not tied to agriculture. Agriculture
accounts for a decreasing percentage of the work force as well as a
decrease in the income produced toward the GNP. Israel's
agricultural sector will have to be restructured so that it can
exploit its maximal advantage - agricultural engineering through
its high R&D investments. It is already cheaper to import many
high water consumption crops such as bananas and citrus than to
grow them or even export them. An exported orange is little more
than a conveniently packaged bag of water. In today's global
market, it is becoming more and more easy and feasible to market
agricultural products. It is significantly easier to transport
containers of fruits and vegetables than water. All of the new
water bag technologies have yet to prove themselves, both
scientifically and economically. Fruits and vegetables, on the
other hand are transported around the world with amazing ease and
speed. Major pipe dreams such as the peace canal project or the
mini-peace pipe canal are expensive and outdated concepts. When
food security is no longer an issue in the current world in which
we live, water can be related to in its proper perspective.
Water security must be maintained primarily for domestic use.
Israel and Palestine have enough good quality fresh water for some
14 million people between the sea and the river. We do not have to
eliminate agriculture, but we must restructure the agricultural
market in an economic way. Palestinians can still develop their
agricultural sector because they are still in need of many labor
intensive branches such as field crops, flowers, and fruit
plantations. Israel, on the other hand, can afford to concentrate
on less labor intensive, scientifically advanced agriculture, such
as in the development of new seeds, genetically engineered, which
will be sold abroad for very high prices at low water costs and low
labor intensity. Israel can also afford to concentrate on
high-yield greenhouse agriculture aimed primarily at export markets
in Europe, the United States and perhaps the Gulf States which are
already dependent on fruits and vegetables from abroad.
A Joint Interest
Many Israeli farmers would be very opposed to these suggestions. To
them, the answer is that even without a water crisis, the
agricultural sector is going to be revised and changed. Two and a
half percent of the labor force cannot dictate to the country's
macro needs. Individual farmers who lose their source of income
will have to be compensated by the state in some form. This is
already the case, because the economic trade agreement between
Israel and the PLO will phase out certain select sectors of
Israel's agriculture simply because Palestinians will produce the
same goods for a lot less money.
Eventually, Palestinians will also face the possibility of making
vast revisions in their agricultural sector, but that prospect is
still at least ten years away. In the meantime, after agreeing to
let the Palestinians have most of the water in the mountain
aquifer, Israel will adjust to having less water for agriculture.
Israel will begin to become more an importer of certain
agricultural products. In the near future these goods will be
purchased from the Palestinians and in the more distant future,
instead of purchasing water from Turkey, Israel will buy citrus and
other fruit and vegetable products from Spain, Morocco, Italy,
Turkey and other countries. Chiquita bananas will replace Jordan
Valley bananas. Israel will continue to grow sophisticated flowers
for export to Europe and winter tomatoes and other vegetables as
cash crops. The Palestinians will have their fair share of the
mountain aquifer (all of it within ten years). At that time
Palestinians will need to begin to think about new sources of water
and new water policies.
If the water conflict between Israel and the Palestinians can be
brought to its proper perspective and proportions, Israel would
find it possible to be generous to the Palestinians. This would
serve as more than a good-will gesture. It will provide the
Palestinians with another financial assistance program. It would
pave the road to greater cooperation in water technology and
agriculture. It would also help to phase out some of the anguish of
the past. Israel will have to make investments in desalination
technology (which it will eventually have to make anyway). By
linking this plan to the peace process, the international community
will help fund the cost of Israel's generosity to the Palestinians.
Adopting this plan would be in the interest of the Israelis no less
than in the interest of the Palestinians.
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