Negotiations for a final settlement between Palestinians and
Israelis are now officially under way. They were started with
speeches by the Israeli foreign minister, David Levy, and
subsequent statements by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, especially in
the Jewish settlement of Ma'ale Adumim, which he declared would
remain a part of Israel, and in a programmatic speech by Mahmoud
Abbas (Abu Mazen). Thus, the two sides have presented their
principled positions regarding the complex issues of the permanent
settlement. According to the latest Sharm el-Sheikh agreement, the
two sides are, consequently, expected to reach a solution to all
final-status issues within one year. Is this workable? Or are we to
be faced with agreements like those we have experienced during the
last years? And, finally, in light of the existing situation, what
are the solutions that can be viewed as possible? Before embarking
on any speculation, it is worthwhile to take stock of the
Palestinian and Israeli positions regarding a permanent settlement
as proclaimed in the respective above-mentioned speeches.
The Palestinian Position
• The implementation of UN resolutions 242 and 338 and the
rest of the relevant international resolutions, and the application
of the principle reached in Madrid [1991] of "land for peace" (all
the land, from a Palestinian point of view).
• The establishment alongside Israel of an independent
Palestinian state on all the Palestinian land occupied by Israel in
1967, i.e., within the June 4, 1967, borders.
• Arab East Jerusalem as the capital of the State of
Palestine.
• The delineation of borders between the State of Palestine
and the State of Israel based on the above.
• The return of Palestine refugees or compensation, in
accordance with UN resolutions, of those who so desire.
• The dismantlement of Jewish settlements built on
Palestinian land after the 1967 Israeli occupation of these lands,
as these settlements are considered illegal and an obstacle to
peace.
• Access to an equitable share of water.
The Israeli Position
• A theoretical recognition of international resolutions (at
most, 242 and 338), but without readiness for the implementation or
even reference to these resolutions in Israel's official political
discourse.
• The Israeli position does not object, in principle, to the
concept of a Palestinian state (in line with the resolutions of the
Labor party), but this state should be demilitarized and connected
to Israel by a series of agreements constricting the exercise of
its sovereignty, its economic ties and its regional alliances: an
"independent" state under the umbrella of total Israeli security
supervision and control.
• "United Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel." Israel
will, however, be ready to share administrative matters, and to
recognize certain Palestinian symbols in the city and surrounding
areas, but Israeli sovereignty over the city will remain
total.
• There will be no return of Palestinian refugees within the
borders of the State of Israel. A limited number of refugees will
be allowed to return to the Palestinian National Authority areas
conditional upon Israeli approval. There is no place in Israeli
policy for the concept of compensation, only for help in the
resettlement of refugees, inside Palestine or in the surrounding
countries of the Diaspora.
• There will be no return to the June 1967 borders. Extensive
land areas of the West Bank will be annexed, including parts of the
Jordan Valley; major settlement blocs like Gush Etzion, Ariel and
the areas surrounding Qalqiliya; and Greater Jerusalem.
• Major settlements blocs will not be removed, but placed
under Israeli sovereignty and connected to Israel by safe passages,
bypassing Palestinian areas. Israel will consider dismantling
settlements that are small, dispersed and isolated.
• Israel will continue controlling the lion's share of the
water, as it considers it has legitimate right to the aquifers in
the West Bank, first as a natural extension to it and second,
because Jewish settlements are built over them.
These are the main points that the Palestinian and Israeli sides
will place on the negotiating table during the coming period, in an
attempt to reach a common agenda as stipulated by the Sharm
el-Sheikh agreement. No deep analysis is needed in this context for
us to envisage the impossibility of reaching compromises on the
issues mentioned above, either because they are much too difficult
to solve, or because they conflict with each side's adopted
strategies, or for a lack of political courage to take sensitive
and existential decisions.
Clearly, Israel will proceed in its policy of settlement expansion
(a function of Israeli interests and the requirements of a
government coalition), especially those settlements that fall
within the major blocs. It will also go on building bypass roads,
turning the settlement blocs into points of attraction for further
settlers, especially new immigrants. It will also consolidate its
hegemony over Arab East Jerusalem through an increased deployment
of Israeli police in the various quarters of the city (as is the
case now in the Old City), bringing to the fore the question of the
Arab demographic bomb and the necessity to "reestablish the
demographic balance in the city." The object is to ensure a Jewish
majority of more than 70 percent in the eastern part of the city
(this is the concerted effort of Ehud Olmert, mayor of Jerusalem,
and Haim Ramon, minister for Jerusalem). As a consequence there
will be increased pressure on the Palestinian inhabitants of
Jerusalem to leave and a stepped-up attempt to lure Israelis to the
city.
The agreement signed in Sharm el-Sheikh stipulates the two sides
reach a common agenda on permanent-status issues before the
completion of implementation. As this seems to be an impossible
proposition, the implementation of the Wye River Memorandum will be
deadlocked. Consequently, after some more land and powers will have
reverted to the Palestinians, one can foresee the scenario of an
impasse similar to the one under Netanyahu's rule, giving the
Israeli side more time for the expansion of settlements and the
creation of facts in many final-status related issues.
The more time passes, the more complications arise, making a
permanent solution nearly impossible. If we agree that both sides
are now seeking separation (at least this is what emerges from
their declared positions), it is clear that a conflict exists
between this strategy [of separation] and what is actually taking
place and will take place on the ground.
I sometimes wonder whether the Israelis are really aware of what
they are doing, or do events in Israel take place without planning,
subject only to coalition considerations or the political survival
of one individual or group? If the Palestinian leadership takes
note of this enigma, will it still cling to the Oslo strategy,
which it understood would lead to the establishment of a
Palestinian entity/state alongside the State of Israel? Directly
after the signing of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement, Barak foresaw
an impasse and proceeded to propose partial solutions similar to
Wye River, but lacking a conclusion (i.e., a succession of interim
periods in each of which the Palestinians are given a few more
meters of land, but much less than the land area over which Jewish
settlements will expand within the same time period). We will then
have another Sharm el-Sheikh agreement that will lead to another
dead-end for the thousandth time. Following the rules of this game
will become impossible from a Palestinian perspective, because this
is a course that will neither lead to an independent Palestinian
state and the retrieval of Palestinian soil, nor will it meet the
minimum level of the Palestinian political program in the shadow of
an Israeli policy that daily dictates a reality that is not easily
reversible. The most that one can achieve will be a Palestinian
administration of civil affairs (internal security, education,
health, communication, etc.), as is the case at present, but with
the expansion of some powers and of the geographical area in which
to exercise those powers.
In point of fact, we Palestinians are living today in what can be
construed as a binational state, but under the total hegemony of
one people: the Israeli. We leave the country with a permit or with
Israeli permission (this includes ministers in the Palestinian
government). Theoretically, we do not leave our cities and towns
without Israeli permission. Even after the opening of the safe
passage between Gaza and the West Bank, the passage remains under
Israeli control; some of us will pass through the passage, but
again with Israeli permission. We neither export nor do we import
without the permission of Israel, etc. We live under rules that
Israel has decreed should remain in place. And what is more
aggravating is that the characterization of occupation has started
to dissipate, giving further credence to my earlier claim that what
we are experiencing now is the beginning of binationalism.
Both sides will have to consider carefully where we are headed if a
settlement is not reached within a short period, not exceeding five
years, and culminating in a Palestinian state alongside Israel.
Israel has to decide, now and before it is too late, whether it
wants to live on within a binational state on equal terms with
Palestinians (who now constitute around 40 percent of the total
population), or within an apartheid system. The Palestinians, for
their part, have to decide whether the slogan of an independent
Palestinian state on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 is
now passé and that a radical change in strategy and political
program is in order.